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A Call for Intellectual Honesty:
A Response to the Uniform

Mediation Act's
Privilege Against Disclosure
J. Brad Reich*
I. INTRODUCTION

Historically the mediation field has been widely unregulated. The result has
been that definitions, rules, and protections have varied greatly or not existed at all.'
In response to this confusion and uncertainty, the Uniform Mediation Act draft'
(hereinafter UMA) has attempted to create a framework for consistency and

*. J.D. with Honors Drake University School of Law (1994), LL.M. University of Missouri-Columbia
School of Law (2001). I would like to thank Jean Stemlight, John Lande, Len Riskin, and the LL.M.
candidates of 2000-2001 for the input, insight, and assistance, that made this article possible. I would also
like to thank the drafters of, and contributors to, the Uniform Mediation Act. While I disagree with the
basis and application of the Privilege Against Disclosure, I commend them for undertaking a task that was
absolutely necessary and unquestionably daunting.
1. See generallyGregory A. Litt, No Confidence: The Problemof Confidentialityby LocalRule in the
ADR Act of 1998, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1015 (2000).
2. Seegenerally U.M.A. Prefatory Note & Reporter's Notes (prop. off. draft May 4,2001). The UMA
is sponsored by the American Bar Association and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. The intent of the UMA is to create a uniform law governing mediation that will be
adopted by the individual states. Id. at Prefatory n. 2. The primary focus of the UMA is "to provide a
privilege that assures confidentiality in legal proceedings." Id. at Prefatory n. 1.
The UMA was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws on August 16, 2001. A number of floor amendments were incorporated into the approved form.
I was able to review the approved text of the UMA. That text had not yet gone to the Committee on Style.
The final form of the UMA may differ in minor ways from the provisions identified in this article, but
there should be no major substantive differences.
The May 4, 2001, Draft Uniform Mediation Act is a thirty-four page document downloaded
from www.pon.harvard.edu/guests/uma/NovUMAWP.htm. Approximately six pages of the document
are the provisions for the proposed UMA. The remainder is composed of Prefatory Notes and Reporter's
Notes.
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protection in the mediation process.' Specifically, the UMA seeks to protect the
confidentiality of mediation communications4 through the creation of the following
privilege:
SECTION 5. PRIVILEGE AGAINST DISCLOSURE; ADMISSIBILITY;
DISCOVERY
(a) A mediation communication is privileged and is not subject to discovery
or admissible in evidence in a proceeding.'
(b) In a proceeding, the following privileges apply;
(1) A party may refuse to disclose, and may prevent any other person from
disclosing, a mediation communication.
(2) A mediator may refuse to disclose a mediation communication, and
may prevent any other person from disclosing, a mediation communication
of the mediator.
(3) A nonparty participant may refuse to disclose, and may
prevent any other person from disclosing, a mediation
communication of the nonparty participant.
(c) Evidence that is otherwise admissible or subject to
discovery does not become inadmissible or protected from
discovery solely by reason of its use in a mediation.6
This Privilege Against Disclosure would codify a popular view. It is a
widely held belief in the mediation community that the mediation process requires
confidentiality to promote the disclosure of information by parties and to reinforce
the parties' belief in the neutrality of the mediator. While confidentiality and
privilege are two very different concepts,' the UMA has chosen a privilege
mechanism to help to ensure that a degree of confidentiality is mandated by law for
the mediation process. According to popular opinion that would be a good thing.
The problem is that the Privilege Against Disclosure substitutes convenience for

3. The UMA defines "mediation" as "a process in which a mediator facilitates communication and
negotiation between parties to assist them in reaching a voluntary agreement regarding their dispute."

U.M.A. § 3(2).

4. The UMA defines a "mediation communication" as "a statement, whether oral, in record, verbal,
or nonverbal, that is made or occurs during a mediation for purposes of considering, conducting,
participating in, initiating, continuing, or reconvening a mediation or retaining a mediator." Id. § 3(3).
5. The UMA defines a "proceeding" as "a legislative hearing or similar process, or a judicial,
administrative, arbitral, or other adjudicative process, including related pre-hearing and post-hearing
motions, conferences, and discovery." Id. § 3(8).
6. Id. § 5.
7. See infra text accompanying nn. 80-82.
8. See e.g. Fred C. Zacharias, Harmonizing Privilege and Confidentiality, 41 S. Tex. L. Rev. 69
(1999).
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intellectual honesty. As I will discuss, there is no empirical support for the creation
of the Privilege Against Disclosure and there is no demonstrable utilitarian societal
justification for that privilege. Further, the UMA privilege would apply to a
relationship of adversarial interests. Privilege has never been applied to such a
relationship and I will argue that it should only be applied to relationships of
common interests.
I do not expect this article to be warmly welcomed by the mediation
community or proponents of the Privilege Against Disclosure. I will flatly challenge
the dogma that "mediation needs confidentiality" 9and the belief that privilege is an
appropriate mechanism for attempting to create confidentiality for mediation
communications.'0 The minimal debate that has previously occurred on this topic
has focused on whether or not mediation has shown general empirical" or societal 2
justification for a privilege. The only two authors arguing against the creation of a
general mediation privilege have asserted that an empirical case for such a privilege
has not been made.' 3 They have left the collection and analysis of empirical data to
those who would proffer the privilege. It does not appear that mediation privilege
proponents have been eager to pick up that gauntlet, but I will analyze data from
analogous fields using confidential relationships (primarily attorney-client and
psychotherapist-patient) and conclude that there is no empirical support for the
contention that mediation needs confidentiality. Absent such empirical support,
legislatures should not adopt the UMA Privilege Against Disclosure because there
is no demonstrated need for the privilege.
Very few have argued against the general creation of a mediation privilege.
Until now none have argued that privilege is not an appropriate mechanism for
creating confidentiality for mediation communications. I take the position that
privilege should not be applied to create confidentiality in the mediation process
because that application would be fundamentally contrary to the relationships
traditionally protected by privilege. Historically privilege has only been applied to
relationships of common interests. There is no precedent for applying privilege to
a relationship of competing interests, but that is precisely what the Privilege Against
Disclosure would do. Applying privilege based on the subjective perception of
importance, and ignoring empirical analysis and historical precedent, will make
privileges common and obviate their otherwise unique value.

9. See e.g. Lynne H. Rambo, ImpeachingLying Parties With Their Statements DuringNegotiation:
Demysticizing the Public Policy Rationale Behind Evidence Rule 408 and the Mediation-Privilege
Statutes, 75 Wash. L. Rev. 1037, 1064 (2000) ("It is universally recognized that in order for [mediation]
to work, [it] must be conducted in a spirit of candor and in such fashion that anything said or done during
the discussions will not cause jeopardy to any of the parties should there be subsequent litigation").
10. To my knowledge, only two other authors have voiced criticism of the belief that "mediation needs
confidentiality" as support for a mediation privilege. See Scott H. Hughes, A Closer Look: The Casefor
a Mediation PrivilegeStill Has Not Been Made, 5 Dis. Res. Mag. 14 (1998); Eric D. Green, A Heretical
View of the Mediation Privilege,2 Ohio. St. J. on Dis. Res. 1 (1986).
11. See Hughes, supran. 10, at 14 ("[T]here is no empirical work to demonstrate a connection between
privileges and the ultimate success of mediation"). See also Green, supra n. 10, at 2 ("Neither the
necessity for such a privilege or the social utility of a general mediation privilege have been
demonstrated").
12. Green supra n. 10, at 31-35.
13. Seesupran. 10.
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This paper is comprised of four sections In Section II, I will argue that
state legislatures should analyze the Privilege Against Disclosure under the standard
of "reason and experience." 4 In this context, "reason" requires the use of abstract
logic,' 5 while "experience" requires the use of empirical analysis when creating or
interpreting privileges. 6 I will first use the case of Jaffee v. Redmond,'7 and
research from related fields, to discuss "experience" in analogous relationships and
to argue that there is no empirical evidence to support the assertion that mediation
needs confidentiality. 8 I will then analyze "reason" under the Wigmore analysis' 9
to determine whether there is a utilitarian societal justification for the Privilege
Against Disclosure. The Wigmore analysis consists of four steps, each of which
must be met for the recognition of a privilege. I will argue that the privilege
proposed by the UMA fails all four steps and that there is no demonstrated societal
justification for the recognition of the Privilege Against Disclosure.
In Section III, I will discuss the historical development, use, and scope of
the attorney-client privilege, the husband-wife privilege, the priest-penitent privilege,
and the physician-patient privilege. I will argue that the UMA creation has no
support in the historical use ofprivilege protection. The UMA anticipates mediation
being used to address disputes between parties with differing legal rights and
interests.'o Relational privileges have not been, and should not be, applied to
relationships of adverse interests. Ignoring uniform precedent simply to create the
Privilege Against Disclosure will open the door to making privileges common and
obviating their unique value. Applying the UMA privilege to relationships of
adversarial interests is also likely to undermine the public policy interest in fostering
knowing and informed resolution to disputes because the Privilege Against
Disclosure would actually benefit and protect parties who "disclose" false or
misleading information during mediation.
I will offer an alternative to the Privilege Against Disclosure in Section IV
and propose the creation of mediation confidentiality through contract provisions.
I will argue that there is no mechanism that guarantees absolute confidentiality of
communications made in mediation. I will further argue that the level of

14. "Reason and experience" is the standard applied by federal courts, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Evidence 501, when creating or construing privileges at federal common law. See infra text
accompanying n. 43.
15. As I will discuss, "abstract logic" refers to a utilitarian societal justification for the creation or
application of a privilege.
16. See Daniel A. Cantu, When Should FederalCourts Require Psychotherapiststo Testify About
Their Patients?An InterpretationofJaffee v. Redmond, 1998 U. Chi. Legal F. 375, 384 (1998) ("In this
context, 'reason' implies the use of abstract logic to arrive at a conclusion; 'experience' requires that courts
bring factual or empirical evidence to bear on their decisions").
17. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
18. The standard is "reason and experience," but I will examine the "experience" component first
because it develops and discusses data necessary for later analysis of the "reason" component.
19. 8 Wigmore Evidence §§ 2191-92, 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
20. See U.M.A. § 5(a). Section 5(a) applies the protection of the Privilege Against Disclosure to the
disclosure of information in "a proceeding." The UMA applies the Privilege Against Disclosure to
subsequent adversarial proceedings such as court action, administrative hearings, arbitration hearings, and
other adjudicative processes. Id. § 3(8). There can be no subsequent adversarial proceedings without
previously adversarial interests.
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confidentiality needed and wanted in mediation varies and is properly defined by the
parties to a particular dispute.
I will discuss and respond to three potential concerns of creating
confidentiality through contractual provision. First, contract provisions are not
binding on persons not parties to the contract. As a purely legal principle this is
undoubtedly correct, but I will argue that while contract provisions cannot
specifically bind non-parties, they can decrease the risk of disclosure of mediation
communications to and by non-parties. Second, while it is true that contractual
provisions may be voided as violative of public policy, I will argue that courts have
generally upheld contractual confidentiality provisions and only voided them when
the need for confidentiality was outweighed by a sufficiently compelling interest.
Third, contract provisions are not afforded the same level of legal protection as a
privilege. I freely admit that this position, again, is generally true. However, it is
unclear when, and to what extent, any mediation confidentiality protection, including
privilege, will be upheld. In light of this uncertainty, it is more intellectually honest
to allow parties to draft contract provisions specifying what type of confidentiality
protection they want in a particular mediation, than to allow them to blindly rely on
a privilege where the scope of protection is unknown.
II. THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST DISCLOSURE DOES NOT
SATISFY THE STANDARD OF "REASON AND EXPERIENCE"
THAT SHOULD BE APPLIED BY STATE LEGISLATURES
CONSIDERING THE ENACTMENT OF STATUTORY PRIVILEGES
A. The Privilege Against DisclosureShould be Analyzed
by State Legislatures Under the
Standardof "Reason and Experience"
The UMA, and its Privilege Against Disclosure, would be submitted to state
legislatures for adoption. Admittedly, state legislatures do not have to apply any
specific standard in the creation or interpretation of statutory privileges.2 In this
section I will argue they should analyze the Privilege Against Disclosure 22 under the

21. The UMA drafters argue that twenty-one states have used a privilege structure to create legal
protections for mediation confidentiality. U.M.A. Reporter's Notes for § 5, at 20. The legislative history
is unclear regarding what, if any, standard the states applied when creating those privileges.
22. i would argue that state legislatures should analyze all prospective statutory privileges under the
standard of "reason and experience," but other privileges are beyond the scope of this article.
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standard of "reason and experience"23 for three reasons.24 First, and most
importantly, the "reason and experience" standard will safeguard the unique value
of privileges. Second, several federal and state courts have recognized that such a
safeguard is necessary and have applied "reason and experience" in creating or
interpreting privileges. Third, I suspect that if a sufficient number of states adopt the
Privilege Against Disclosure, it will be asserted as federal common law at some
point.25 When that happens the privilege will be analyzed under the standard of
"reason and experience" required by Federal Rule of Evidence 501.26 If true
uniformity is the goal of the UMA, then its Privilege Against Disclosure should be
adopted by state legislatures only if that same privilege will be adopted at federal
common law."
The term "privilege" is derived from the Latin phrase "privata lex," meaning
a private law applied to a small group of persons as a special prerogative.2" Even
though evidence may be relevant to a trier of fact, the purpose of a privilege is to
protect certain communications from compulsory revelation based on the
maintenance of desirable social relationships. 29 For purposes of this article,
privilege is defined as the unique ability not to reveal information where persons in
other circumstances would have no protection from compelled revelation. I interpret
privileges as being used to protect information that would be likely to cause social
embarrassment, potential professional or civil liability, or criminal action if revealed.
Privileges are unique legal devices and they carry a certain level of importance
precisely because they are unique.
The courts are in the best position to view the actual effects of privileges.
As succinctly stated by Professor Edmund M. Morgan:

23. The phrase "reason and experience" appears to have originated, at least in the context of federal
common law principles, in Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 12 (1934) (holding that the "rules
governing competence of witnesses in criminal trials in federal courts are not necessarily restricted to
those local rules in force at the time of the admission into the Union of the particular state where the trial
takes place, but are governed by common-law principles as interpreted and applied by the federal courts
in the light of reason and experience").
24. For a related position see Raymond F. Miller, CreatingEvidentiaryPrivileges:An Argument for
the JudicialApproach, 31 Conn. L. Rev. 771 (1999) (arguing that the federal common law approach to
creating privileges is superior to the states' legislatively-based method).
25. See Charles W. Ehrhardt, Confidentiality,Privilege,and Rule 408: The Protection ofMediation
Proceedingsin FederalCourt, 60 La. L. Rev., 91, 118 (1999) ("If the mediation privilege provision
presently included in the [p]roposed [UMA] is widely adopted by the states, this factor used to determine
whether to recognize a 'common law' privilege will more clearly be present").
26. See infra text accompanying n. 43.
27. See Folb v. Motion PictureIndus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1179 (C.D. Cal.
1998) ("Practically speaking, the confidential status accorded to mediation proceedings by the states will
be of limited value if the federal courts decline to adopt a federal mediation privilege").
28. Ralph Slovenko, Psychiatryand a Second Look at the Medical Privilege,6 Wayne L. Rev. 175,
181 (1960).
29. Roy D. Weinberg, Confidential and other Privileged Communication 2 (Oceana Publ. 1967). See
Lawrence R. Freedman & Michael L. Prigoff, Confidentiality in Mediation: The Needfor Protection,
2 Ohio St. J. on Dis. Res. 37, 39 (1986) ("A rule of privilege ... shuts out probative evidence, and thus
obstructs the truth in order to protect some other interest or policy").
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[Privileges] are nothing more or less than privileges
to suppress the truth, and no officers of any department
of government, other than the judiciary, have the
constant opportunity to observe them in operation and
the skill to determine how far and in what respects they
interfere with the orderly and effective administration of
justice."a

The courts have clearly "indicated a narrowing interpretation of existing
privileges and a hesitation to recognize new privileges under the principles of...
common law."'" Effectively the courts have created a presumption against
privileges:
For more than three centuries it has been
recognized as a fundamental maxim that the public...
has a right to everyman's evidence. When we come
to examine the various claims of exemption, we start
with the primary assumption that there is a general
duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving,
and that any exemptions which may exist are
so many derogations from
distinctly exceptional, 3being
2
a positive general rule.
Limitations may be placed on the general rule requiring each person to give
the best evidence at their disposal when there is a "public good transcending the
normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining [the]
truth."33 Whatever the origin of such exceptions, they are not lightly created nor
expansively construed because they are in derogation of the search for truth.34
Privileges are abrogations of everyman's duty to provide all available evidence to the
trier of fact."5
The "concept of privileged communication, as applied in the rules of
evidence, is derived from considerations of public policy rather than any 'right'
vested in confidentiality itself."36 Those public policy considerations have ancient

30. Edmund M. Morgan, Rules ofEvidence-Substantiveor Procedural?,10 Vand. L. Rev. 467,483-84
(1956-57).
It appears that the federal legislature recognizes this fact as well. In 1998 Congress codified
the Federal ADR Act of 1998. See A.D.R. Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315, § 2, 112 Stat. 2993 (1998)
codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (West Supp. 1999). The Act required that every federal
court implement an ADR program. The Act specifically left the issue of mediation confidentiality to the
ninety-seven individual federal courts, rather than establishing a mediation privilege to be applied by them
all.
31. Ehrhardt, supran.25, at 114.
32. U.S. v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1949) (citing I Wigmore on Evidence § 2191 (3d ed., Little,
Brown & Co. 1940).
33. Elkins v. U.S., 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
34. U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
35. Id. at709 (quotingBryan, 339 U.S. at331; Blackmerv. U.S., 284 U.S.421,428 (1932); Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972)).
36. Weinberg, supra n.29, atIntroduction.
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origins, "[t]he idea that the law should protect the sanctity of relationships finds its
roots in Roman law, where 'the basis for exclusion [of testimony] was the general
moral duty not to violate the underlying fidelity upon which the protected
relationship was built.' 37 "No pledge of secrecy nor professional ethic can prevail
against the general principle of full testimonial disclosure, unless it issues from a
relationship regarded by law as worthy of encouragement and maintenance even at
the cost of occasional suppression of testimony. 35
The United States Supreme Court has been clear that a party seeking
judicial recognition of a new evidentiary privilege, under the standard of "reason and
experience," must "demonstrate with a high degree of clarity and certainty that the
proposed privilege will effectively advance [that] public good., 39 Even in cases
where the proposed privilege is designed in part to protect constitutional rights, the
Court has demanded that the proponent come forward with a compelling empirical
case for the necessity of the privilege.40 A generalized assertion of privilege must
give way to a strong and demonstrable need for evidence in a given set of facts.4
In 1975 Congress enacted Federal Rule of Evidence 501 (hereinafter Rule
501) because it wanted to allow federal courts to create or interpret privilege
protection, while also trying to ensure that privileges were recognized in a manner
consistent with their historical scarcity, importance, and use. 42 Rule 501 formalized
the standard of "reason and experience":
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United
States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by
the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the
privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political
subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience.43

37. Miller, supra n. 24, at 782 (quoting State ex rel.State Hwy. Dept. v. 62.96427Acres of Land, 193
A.2d 799, 806 (Del. Super. 1963).
38. Weinberg, supra n.29, at Introduction.
39. In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073,1076 (D.C. Cir.1998). See e.g. U.S. v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360,
375 (1980).
40. See Ehrhardt, supra n. 25, at 120 (citing In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073); Swindler & Berlin v.
U.S., 524 U.S. 399 (1998)) ("[T]he courts [have] emphasized the need for empirical evidence to support
the recognition of a new privilege or to restrict the application of an existing one. In light of these recent
decisions, the most persuasive argument to recognize a mediation privilege under Rule 501 would be
based on empirical data that demonstrates that the values of mediation are enhanced injurisdictions which
have a broad mediation privilege as contrasted with those which simply protect confidentiality
[otherwise]").
41. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 713 (holding that assertion of a form ofexecutive privilege based on general
confidentiality concerns cannot supersede due process demands).
42. It is my sense that the purpose of Rule 501 was to leave questions of privilege construction and
interpretation to the courts because they are in the best position to understand and evaluate the actual uses
and effects of those privileges. See Morgan, supra n. 30, at 483-484.
43. Fed. R. Evid. 501 (2001).
The general rule is that "when a case is in federal court, due to a federal question, the court
is required to apply federal common law when analyzing the applicable or proposed Privilege". See
Jennifer C. Bailey, Student Author, The Mediator'sPrivilege: Can a Mediator be Compelled to Testify
in a Civil Case? CaliforniaPrivilegeLaw Says Yes, 2000 J.of Dis. Res. 395,398 (2000). State privilege
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The evolution of Rule 501 is particularly important when discussing the
creation of any new privilege. The Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted in 1975.
Proposed drafts were disseminated prior to ratification. Article V of the proposed
Rules would have recognized nine discrete privileges." Article V was to be
exclusive except as otherwise provided by the United States Constitution, acts of
Congress, or other Supreme Court Rules. 45 Federal common law development of
privileges was to be frozen and state privilege law was to be superseded in all federal
cases.4 6 These proposed Article V Rules were rejected in favor of Rule 501.
The Senate Report accompanying the adoption of the rules was clear that
the intent of Rule 501, and its standard of "reason and experience," "should be
understood as reflecting the view that the recognition of a privilege based on a
confidential relationship... should be determined on a case-by-case basis. "47 That
guidance has been routinely implemented in decisions of the Supreme Court and its
holdings that Rule 501 directed the federal courts to continue the evolutionary
development of testimonial privileges.48 While this rationale could lead readers to
believe that the Court is ready to accept expansion of privilege protection, the
opposite is true. The federal courts are clear that privileges are not to be recognized
under Rule 501 unless the new privilege promotes sufficiently important interests to
outweigh the need for probative evidence. 49 Even necessity does not require the
recognition of privileges in all cases.50 Rule 501, and its standard of "reason and

law is not applied unless the matter at issue is an element of a state claim or defense. Id. (quoting Sen.
Rpt. 93-1277, at 11-24 (1974)).
44. See proposed Fed. R. Evid. 503, 56 F.R.D. 235, 235-37 (1972). Article V would have included
attorney-client, psychotherapist-patient, husband-wife, and priest-penitent privileges, it would not have
recognized physician-patient or journalist-source privileges. While it is beyond the scope of this article,
this prioritization may simply reflect powerful or effective lobbying of groups at interest. See Miller,
supra n. 24, at 787 (quoting Charles Nesson, Modes of Analysis: The Theories and Justificationsof
Privileged Communications, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1471, 1479 (1985)) ("The real roots of privilege law lie
in the power of those benefitting from it"). It is exactly this type of concern that makes it essential that
a proposed privilege is supported by a rational and empirical basis. Opponents of Article V noted that
its Advisory Committee consisted entirely of lawyers who had drafted an elaborate attorney-client
privilege, while discarding privileges for other professions. See H.R. Jud. Comm., Rules ofEvidence:
HearingsBefore the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal CriminalLaws of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 243 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (citing letter from Prof. Charles L. Black Jr.).
45. See proposed Fed. R. Evid. 501,56 F.R.D. 230, 230 (1972).
46. Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An Alternative to the
Proposed Federal Rules ofEvidence, 62 Geo. L. J. 61, 66 (1973).
47. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 8 (quoting Sen. Rpt. 93-1277, at 13 (1974) (reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.

7051, 7059)).
48. See e.g. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 711-712; Trammel v. U.S., 445 U.S. 40,47 (1990).
49. See e.g. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 711-712; Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51. See also N.L.R.B. v. Macaluso,
618 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1980) (quoting Wigmore, supra n. 32, at § 11) (holding that the public interest
being protected by privilege "must be substantial if it is to cause us to 'concede that the evidence in
question has all the probative value that can be required, and yet exclude it because its admission would
injure some other cause more than it would help the cause of truth, and because the avoidance of that
injury is considered of more consequence that the possible harm to the cause of truth"').
50. Daniel W. Shuman & Myron F. Weiner, The Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege: A Critical
Examination 54 (Charles C. Thomas 1987) (quoting Wheeler v.LeMarchant, 17 Ch. D. 675,681 (1881))
("in the first place, the principle protecting confidential communications is of a very limited character.
It does not protect all confidential communications which a man must necessarily make in order to obtain
advice, even when needed for the protection ofhis life, or of his honour, or of his fortune. There are many
communications which, though absolutely necessary because without them the ordinary business of life
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experience," recognizes that the ad hoc creation of privileges would devalue
privilege importance and decrease the level of privilege protection as a whole.
The standard of "reason and experience" addresses two very different
concerns. I define "reason" as requiring utilitarian social justification for the creation
of a privilege. I propose that "reason" should be evaluated under the frequently used
four-step Wigmore analysis.51 I define "experience" as requiring courts to use
empirical analysis in the creation or interpretation of privileges. I propose that
"experience" should be evaluated in light of empirical research on point to the
proposed privilege, or from related or analogous fields.52
The "reason and experience" standard has been applied by federal courts to
a wide variety of existing and proposed privileges. Courts have applied it to the
"husband-wife privilege,"53 the "psychotherapist-patient privilege,"5 4 a "presidentialsecret service" or "protective function privilege,"" a "presidential privilege of
immunity from judicial process, 5 6 a "corporate ombudsman privilege, '" several
variations of a "parent-child privilege,"" the "debate privilege,"5 9 the "academic peer
review privilege,"' the "self-critical analysis privilege,"' 6' a "police personnel file
' 63
privilege,, 62 a "police officer-president of the policeman's association privilege, ,
a "deliberative process privilege,"' and a variation of the attorney-client privilege.65
State legislatures may or may not be applying the "reason and experience"
standard when adopting privileges, 66 but several state courts have used that standard
in creating or interpreting privileges. The "reason and experience" standard
generally, and the Wigmore analysis specifically, have been applied at the state court
level to create or interpret a "psychotherapist-patient privilege,, 67 a "parent-child
privilege,"6 ' and a private and governmental "social worker privilege." 69 At least six
jurisdictions (Arizona, South Carolina, Guam, Indiana, Nevada, and Colorado) have

cannot be carried on, still are not privileged").
51. See infra text accompanying nn. 163-215.
52. See infra text accompanying nn. 85-158.
53. See e.g. Trammel, 444 U.S. 40.
54. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. 1.
55. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073.
56. See Nixon, 418 U. S. 683.
57. See Carman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 114 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 1997).
58. See e.g. In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140 (3d Cir. 1997); In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
UnemancipatedMinor Child,949 F. Supp. 1487 (E.D. Wash. 1996).
59. See In re Grand Jury, 821 F.2d 946 (3d Cir. 1987).
60. See U ofPenn. v. E.E.O.C., 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
61. See e.g. Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 885 F. Supp. 1434 (D. Kan. 1995); Etienne v. Mitre Corp., 146
F.R.D. 145 (E.D. Va. 1993).
62. See Welsh v. City & County of San Francisco,887 F. Supp. 1293 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
63. See Walkerv. Huie, 142 F.R.D. 497 (D. Utah 1992).
64. See Govt Suppliers Cons. Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 135 F.R.D. 531 (S.D. Ind. 1990).
65. SeeHarperv. Auto-OwnersIns. Co., 138 F.R.D. 655 (S.D. Ind. 1991) (attorney asserted privilege
to protect communications made when he was acting as a claims adjuster).
66. See supra n. 21.
67. See Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411 (Alaska 1976).
68. See State v. Grossberg, 1998 WL 117975 (Del. Super. 1998); In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298
(D.C. Nev. 1983).
69. See State v. Driscoll, 193 N.W.2d 851 (Wis. 1972). See also State v. Palmer, 338 N.W.2d 281
(Neb. 1983) (applying a Rule 501 analysis at the state level, but not specifically applying the Wigmore
analysis).
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adopted a rule of evidence specifically using a standard of "reason and experience"
for interpreting or creating privileges. 70 New Mexico has adopted part of that
analysis. 7' Federal Rule of Evidence 501 has been applied by state jurisdictions
because it provides the standard proposed privileges should be measured against.
This standard is necessary because not every relationship is worthy of privilege
protection.
I have discussed the subject of this article with many people having
different interests in mediation, including neophyte mediators, experienced
mediators, mediation advocates and mediation scholars. All but one have almost
immediately offered a variation of one or both of the following responses,
"Everybody knows mediation needs confidentiality," or "Isn't mediation so different
that it deserves its own standard for the creation of a privilege?" I have interpreted
these uniform responses as creating a proposed standard for the recognition of the
UMA Privilege Against Disclosure.72 I term it the "everybody knows it's important"
standard. I do not offer this nomenclature to be snide, in fact I have not offered this
nomenclature at all. These are the justifications presented to me for the creation of
a mediation privilege by people with expertise or experience in the mediation field.
It is my sense that their arguments are indicative of those generally offered by the
field as a whole. I use their standard to provide a comparison to the standard of
"reason and experience."
The historical application of the "reason and experience" standard has
created a presumption against privileges. Without that standard the unique
importance of privileges will be lost. Privileges will be created for a relationship
simply because "everybody knows it's important," without qualifying or quantifying
"everybody" or the level of importance. The "everybody knows it's important"
standard is almost, if not completely, subjective and much easier to satisfy than
"reason and experience." If the "everybody knows it's important" standard is applied
to the creation of a mediation privilege, then it should be applied to all proposed
privileges, and that would change privilege protection as we know it. If the lesser
standard is applied then we should see the creation of many other new privileges for
relationships which everybody knows should be protected simply because they are
important. I offer the following possibilities using such a standard.
Everybody knows familial relationships are important and that information
is shared within the family that could result in social embarrassment or even criminal
charges if it were to be revealed. Following the "everybody knows it's important"
standard, we should have a parent-child privilege, a stepparent-child privilege, a
grandparent-grandchild privilege, a sibling-sibling privilege, and perhaps a cousincousin privilege.
Many of the above privileges may be rooted in the need for children or
minors to have someone to confide to. This type of relationship is not limited to
family members. Under the "everybody knows it's important" standard we could

70. Ariz. R. Evid. 501(2001); S.C. R. Evid. 501 (2000); 6 Guam Code Ann. § 504(2001); Ind. R. Evid.
501 (1996); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 175.221 (1999); Colo. R. Evid. 501 (1997). See also Colo. R. Crim. P. 26
(1998).
71. See Pub. Serv. Co. of New Mexico v. Lyons, 10 P.3d 166 (N.M. App. 2000).
72. It is my sense that these responses would apply to any mediation privilege, but I am limiting the
responses to the UMA privilege for purposes of this article.
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certainly see the foster parent-foster child privilege, the academic teacher-minor
student privilege, the guidance counselor-minor student privilege, and the unlicensed
social worker-minor privilege. It is possible that this type of relationship could exist
when anyone serves as a mentor or confidant to minors. If so, there could be
privileges such as the coach-minor athlete privilege and the non-academic instructorminor pupil privilege.73 This type of protection could logically be extended to
similar relationships without minor parties. We could see the teacher-student
privilege asserted between instructors and students at the college or graduate school
level, 74 the unlicensed social worker-adult case member privilege, and the coachadult athlete privilege.
Everybody recognizes that business and economic relationships are vitally
important to our society and for the functioning of our society. Information is
exchanged among business associates or between service providers and customers
that could cause social embarrassment, civil liability, or even criminal proceedings
if it were subject to forced revelation. Under the "everybody knows it's important"
standard we could have the business partner-business partner privilege, the joint
stock holder privilege, the broker-client privilege, the banker-customer privilege, and
the realtor-buyer or seller privilege.
If the standard is merely "everybody knows it's important" then we will
have privileges applied to very common relationships. It could certainly be argued
that bosses and secretaries regularly exchange information that could be socially
embarrassing or subject to professional or criminal sanctions if it were revealed.
Disruption of the boss-secretary relationship could have a very large cumulative
effect on society as a whole. In light of those concerns, and following the logic of
the "everybody knows it's important" standard, we could reasonably have a bosssecretary privilege.
Some readers may disagree with the potential privileges identified above.
Their responses, again, may be some variations of "Those relationships should not
be privileged, but mediation should be, it's different." With all due respect to that
view, I disagree. All relationships differ to some extent. If a simple standard for
privilege creation is applied so that mediation can be privileged, then that standard
should be applied when groups want to create other privileges. With every new
privilege created under the "every body knows it's important" standard, each existing
privilege would become worth less because privileges as a whole becomes less
unique. 75 Eventually privileges will become common. The unique level of
protection sought by proponents of the Privilege Against Disclosure will be lost
because of the very standard used to create it.

73. The non-academic instructor-pupil privilege could apply to any instructional relationship in which
the pupil is likely to view the instructor as a confidant for personal information. This type of relationship
is likely to include virtually any special skills or interest instruction, especially when undertaken in small
groups or over an extended period of time. Examples may include dance or music instruction, or
activities such as 4-H.
74. This privilege was proposed by Professor Charles Ehrhardt, Ladd Professor of Evidence, Florida
State University College of Law through email correspondence with the author.
75. 1also suspect that as more privileges are created, courts will be more likely to find exceptions to
them both because the unique value of privilege has been decreased by the creation ofnew privileges and
because, if fully enforced, each privilege would keep more relevant evidence from the trier of fact. At
some point a multitude of privileges will substantially interfere with the administration of justice.
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If the Privilege Against Disclosure could pass the standard of "reason and
experience" it would preserve the import of privilege protection and the privilege
should pass Rule 501 analysis if and when it is asserted at federal common law. I
understand why proponents of the Privilege Against Disclosure would want to apply
the lesser "everybody knows it's important" standard. As I will explain, their
mechanism cannot pass either the empirical justification or Wigmore's four-part
analysis under Rule 501.76 However a "reason and experience" standard should be
applied to help ensure that privileges remain unique and important, and that privilege
is a privilege.77

B. Reason and Experience: "Experience"and EmpiricalExamination
Many commentators have discussed confidentiality and the mediation
process. Almost all of these commentators venture forth as if from some firm
location, as if they have some bedrock or touchstone firmly underlying their
analysis. All too often that bedrock is the belief that mediation needs
confidentiality.75 I choose the term "belief' carefully. I respect the view that
mediation needs confidentiality protection, but I submit that view is a belief and
nothing more. 79 There is no empirical evidence establishing that the mediation
process requires confidentiality. Absent empirical proof, state legislatures have
acted too hastily in crafting confidentiality protections for the mediation process.
That folly would be further perpetuated by adopting the Privilege Against
Disclosure.

76. But see Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164; Sheldone v. Penn. Turnpike Commn., 104 F. Supp. 2d 511
(W.D. Pa. 2001) (recognizing forms of a mediation privilege under Rule 501).
77. State legislatures' failure to apply "reason and experience" to the creation of new privileges can
quickly make privileges common. Since the enactment of Rule 501, the federal courts have confirmed
the eight privileges existing at common law prior to 1973 and enacted one new one, the psychotherapistpatient privilege. See Miller, supran. 24, at 775-76. There are now nine federal common law relational
privileges. Id. at 793. In contrast, the state of Connecticut alone currently has twenty-nine privileges.
Id. Since 1974, the federal judiciary has created one new privilege, while Connecticut has created twenty.
Id.
78. See e.g. Freedman & Prigoff, supran. 29, at 38 ("Effective mediation requires candor. A mediator,
not having coercive power, helps parties reach agreement by identifying issues, exploring possible bases
foragreement, encouraging parties to accommodate each other's interests, and uncovering the underlying
causes of conflict. Mediators must be able to draw out baseline positions and interests which would be
impossible if the parties were constantly looking over their shoulders.".... "Compromise negotiations
often require the admission of facts which disputants would otherwise never concede").
But see Hughes, supran. 10, at 14 ("[T]here is no empirical work to demonstrate a connection
between privileges and the ultimate success of mediation"); Green, supra n. 10, at 2 ("1 take the heretical
position among mediators in arguing that the current campaign to obtain a blanket mediation privilege
rests on faulty logic, inadequate data, and short-sighted professional self-interest"). For a related
discussion, see generally Rambo, supra n. 9 (arguing that confidentiality has very little effect on an
honest party's willingness to speak about the facts during negotiation).
79. The arguments set forth by proponents of a mediation privilege share a common deficiency with
the arguments raised in support of a president-secret service privilege in In re Sealed Case. The court
in that case stated that the arguments put forth by the secret service, except for the argument regarding
the nation's interest in the "security of the President," were "based in large part on speculation-thoughtful
speculation, but speculation nonetheless." In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1076 (quoting Swidler & Berlin
v. U.S., 524 U.S. 399, 410 (1998)).
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Mediation confidentiality proponents generally offer variations of two
policy concerns in support of mediation's "need" for confidentiality. ° First, they
maintain that mediation needs confidentiality because confidentiality allows the
parties to participate fully in mediation by protecting both general communications
and specific settlement offers from disclosure to the courts or third parties.8 Second,
they assert that confidentiality protects the integrity of the mediator's role in the
mediation process.8 2 As I will discuss in the following subsections, neither of these
assertions is supported by analogous empirical evidence drawn from
psychotherapist-patient privilege research, attomey-client confidentiality and
privilege research, and therapeutic communication confidentiality and privilege
research.

80. One author contends there is a third related policy concern. He contends that because the scope
for matters addressed under mediation is broader than the scope of matters addressed under our civil or
criminal justice systems, the potential forharm to parties lacking confidentiality is equally increased. See
Paul R. Rice, Mediation and Arbitration as a Civil Alternative to the CriminalJustice System - An
Overview and Legal Analysis, 29 Am. U. L. Rev. 17, 73 (1979).
81. See e.g. Jaime Allison Lee & Carl Giesler, Confidentialityin Mediation, 3 Harv. Negot. L. Rev.
285, 290-92 (1998) (identifying both bases); Litt, supra n. 1, at 1021 ("Confidentiality is critical in
eliciting the candor of the parties in mediation, which is, in turn, critical for the success of the mediation
process." ....
"The assurance of confidentiality also permits the parties to rely on the mediator's
neutrality").
See also Pamela A. Kentra, Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Speak No Evil: The Intolerable
Conflictfor Attorney-Mediators Between the Duty to Maintain Mediation Confidentialityand the Duty
to Report Fellow Attorney Misconduct, 1997 BYU L. Rev. 715,722 (1997) ("Confidentiality lies at the
heart of the mediation process. Mediation would not be nearly as effective if the parties were not assured
their discussions would remain private"); Eileen P. Friedman, Protection of Confidentiality in the
Mediation of Minor Disputes, II Cap. U. L. Rev. 181, 196 (1981) ("The importance of confidentiality
in programs established for the mediation of minor disputes cannot be over-stated. Confidentiality is
essential to achieve the full cooperation of participants and, consequently, the integrity and ultimate
success of the program"); Phillip J. Harter, Neither Cop Nor Collection Agent: Encouraging
Administrative Settlements by EnsuringMediator Confidentiality,41 Admin. L. Rev. 315, 324 (1984)
(arguing that "one of the central functions of mediation is to encourage the parties to speak candidly about
their interest, needs, fears, and desires. If a party has any concern over whether what it tells the mediator
in confidence, or what it does in the negotiations, might be revealed to its detriment, any rational party
would not be as forthcoming .... "); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and Professionalism in NonAdversarialLawyering, 27 Fla. St. L. Rev. 153, 181-82 (1999) ("[T]he essence of mediation is the
preservation of confidential communications"); Joshua J. Engelbart, Student Author, FederalMediation
Privilege: Should Mediation Communications be Protected from Subsequent Civil & Criminal
Proceedings,1999 J. of Dis. Res. 73, 78 ("The promise that communication will remain confidential is
crucial to the success of mediation proceedings") But see Rambo, supran. 9, at 1040 (taking the position
that "confidentiality does not have the widely assumed effect on negotiating parties' willingness to speak
freely about the facts of their cases").
82. See e.g. Lee & Giesler, supra n. 81, at 291-92; Freedman & Prigoff, supra n. 29, at 38 ("The
mediator must remain neutral in fact and in perception. The potential of the mediator to be an adversary
in a subsequent legal proceeding would curtail the disputants freedom to confide during the mediation.
Court testimony by a mediator, no matter how carefully presented, will inevitably be characterized so as
to favor one side or the other. This would destroy a mediator's efficacy as an impartial broker").
See also Macaluso, 618 F.2d at 54 (holding that the National Labor Relations Board properly
revoked the subpoena issued for a mediator of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service because
the "public interest in maintaining perceived and actual impartiality of federal mediators does outweigh
the benefits derivable from [mediator's testimony]"). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
revocation of the subpoena reasoning that allowing the mediator's testimony in court would be contrary
to Congressional aims in creating the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and would interfere
with the effective labor relations that foster national industrial stability. Id.
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1. Jaffee v. Redmond and Psychotherapist-Patient Confidentiality
In Jaffee, the United States Supreme Court recognized a federal common
law psychotherapist-patient privilege under Rule 501.3 The Jaffee analysis helps
us to determine whether the Privilege Against Disclosure is supported by "reason and
experience"and whether it would satisfy that standard if applied by state
legislatures.84 The necessity of using empirical evidence to evaluate proposed
privileges cannot be overstated." The Jaffee Court looked to a variety of empirical
factors in rendering its decision. The Court recognized the empirical fact that all
fifty states, and the District of Columbia, had adopted some form of psychotherapy
privilege. 6 The Court gave a great deal of weight to the fact that the underlying

83. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 9-13. In Jaffee, police officer Mary Lu Redmond shot and killed a suspect who
was allegedly brandishing a knife. After the shooting, Redmond participated in approximately fifty
counseling sessions with a licensed clinical social worker. The victim's estate, through Jaffee as
Administrator, brought suit for the violation of the deceased's constitutional rights and wrongful death.
Jaffee sought access to notes made by Redmond's licensed clinical social worker during the counseling
sessions. Redmond sought to protect the records by asserting a federal common law psychotherapistpatient privilege. Id. at 4-6.
84. The reasoning in Jaffee is particularly applicable to discussion of a mediation privilege because
psychotherapy, like mediation, is a fairly recent development in the United States. See Cantu, supra n.
16, at 376 ("The psychotherapist-patient privilege, however, dates only to the 1950s, and has not produced
the expectations of confidentiality created by the long history and deep cultural roots of the other
privileges. Without those expectations, it bears a greater burden in showing that the benefits of preserving
confidentiality outweigh the resulting loss of evidence").
85. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. I (citing Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 693-94).
86. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 12-15, n. 11.
At the time of the Jaffee decision all fifty states recognized a psychotherapy privilege, but not
all recognized the same type of privilege. Cantu, supra n. 16, at 375-76. Thirteen states treated the
privilege as identical to the attomey-client privilege. Id. at 375. Twenty-two states revoked the privilege
in trials involving specific crimes (most commonly child abuse and homicide). Id. at 375-76. Ten states
terminated the privilege if the patient posed an immediate threat to an identifiable third party. Id. at 376.
Three states specifically allowed the courts to balance the value of the evidence sought against the
privacy of the patient on a case by case basis. Id. Jaffee looked to the states' recognition to establish a
federal common law privilege, but not all of the states recognized the same thing. See Cantu, supra n.
16, at 389 ("Federal courts have no clear scientific theory upon which to base a uniform national
privilege").
In many ways the Privilege Against Disclosure suffers from this same concern, a position that
looks uniform on its face but is not. The difference is that the sources cited by the UMA are even less
consistent. See Ehrhardt, supra n. 25, at 117 ("As contrasted with the psychotherapist privilege, there is
more variance in the protections adopted by the states and not as strong a consensus expressing a
consistent policy determination from which it can be reasoned that 'reason' and 'experience' support the
recognition of a broad mediation privilege").
The UMA identifies that twenty-five states have enacted confidentiality statutes of general
application. U.M.A. Reporter's Notes for § 5(1), at 20. To simply stop analysis at that point would seem
to create some empirical justification for a mediation privilege. It would seem that half of the states have
confidentiality protection...perhaps that means that a majority want it. However the analysis is not that
simple. The UMA goes on to note that of those twenty-five states, twenty-one have used a privilege
structure to create confidentiality. Id. Further research reveals great disparity among those devices. Four
states (Massachusetts, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Texas) attempt to create absolute confidentiality through
privilege. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 233 § 23C (1985); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2317.023 (1996); R.I. Gen.
Laws § 9-19-44 (1992); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 5.60.070 (1993). Approximately ten states
(Arizona, Iowa, Louisiana, Montana, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming) create a privilege similar to the UMA, at least to the extent that it is not intended to be
absolute. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2238 (1993); Iowa Code § 679C.2 (1998); La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
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state law expressly extended privilege protection to licensed social workers.8 7
Perhaps most importantly, the court noted that the importance of a psychotherapistpatient privilege was reinforced by the fact that it was among the exclusive list of
privileges enumerated under the proposed (and rejected) Article V of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. 8
It is not my intention to go into an in-depth analysis of whether the Court
decided Jaffee properly or improperly, but I must address the aspects of Jaffee that
have a direct bearing on the enactment of the Privilege Against Disclosure.
Currently twenty-five states have general confidentiality protection for mediation. 9
Under the logic of the Jaffee court, the adoption of a privilege by a certain number
of states provides at least part of the empirical justification for federal common law
recognition of a privilege. 90 This type of empirical analysis may be beneficial for a
federal court attempting to determine the extent of adoption of a general privilege 9'
at the state level, but the Jaffee Court was not using the number of states having a
psychotherapist-patient privilege to determine the efficacy of that general privilege.
The Court was implicitly relying on the states to have already made that
determination.92 For state legislatures the efficacy of a proposed privilege should be
the primary issue. State adoption of a privilege should not rest on the number of
other jurisdictions adopting a general privilege, but on the empirically demonstrated
value of the specific privilege under consideration. State legislatures analyzing a
proposed privilege should look to studies or research addressing the effect and value
of that proposed privilege.
Jaffee created a federal psychotherapy privilege. At the time Jaffee was
decided there was a body of empirical research available addressing the need, or lack

§ 9:4112 (1997); Mont. Code Ann. § 26-1-813 (1999); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36.220 (1997); Pa. Const.
Stat. Ann. § 5949 (1996); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-576.10 (1994); Wash. Rev. Code § 5.60.070 (1993); Wis.
Stat. § 904.085(4)(a) (1997); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-43-103 (1991). Four states (Kansas, Maine, South
Dakota, and Nevada) use a form of privilege structure, but it is a derivative of the protection of settlement
discussions or negotiations provided by Federal Rule of Evidence 408. See infra text accompanying n.
310. It is not a relational privilege such as the one proposed by the UMA. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-452
(1964); Me. R. Evid. 408 (1997); S.D. Codified Laws § 19-576.10 (1994); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 48.109(3)
(1993). One state (Ohio) relies at least partially on a Rule 408 analysis. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §
2317.023 (1996). The Utah provision cited by the UMA appears to be for a pilot program for visitation
arising out of divorce. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-38(4) (2000). It does not mention confidentiality.
In the final analysis, less than one third of the states (fifteen) use a privilege even tenuously analogous
to the Privilege Against Disclosure.
87. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 16-17.
88. Id.at 2.
89. U.M.A. Reporter's Notes for § 5(l), at 20.
90. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 12-13 (holding that "because state legislatures are fully aware of the need to
protect the integrity of the fact-finding functions of their courts, the existence of a consensus among the
States indicates that "reason and experience" support recognition of [a] privilege"). But see Morgan,
supra n. 30, arguing that legislatures are not in the best position to view and understand the effects of
privilege on the fact finding functions of the courts.
91. I use the term "general privilege" because the state psychotherapist-patient privileges underlying
the Jaffee decision were not uniform. See Cantu, supra n. 16.
92. Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1178-79 (quoting Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 12-13) ("In assessing a proposed
privilege, a federal court should look to a consistent body of state legislative and judicial decisions
adopting such a privilege as an important indicator of both reason and experience. Put simply, 'the policy
decisions of the States bear on the question whether federal courts should recognize a new privilege or
amend the coverage of an existing one'").
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thereof, for confidentiality in psychotherapy, but the court did not mention those
findings. That empirical evidence contradicts several of the policies in favor of the
privilege asserted by the Court. The Court held:
Significant private interests support recognition of a
psychotherapist privilege. Effective psychotherapy
depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust,
and therefore the mere possibility of disclosure of
confidential communications may impede development
of the relationship necessary for successful treatment.93
The Court referenced the Advisory Committee's Notes, "[t]here is wide
agreement that confidentiality is a sine qua non for successful psychiatric
95
treatment. 9 4 This view reflects what is known as the "Strong Form Hypothesis."
The Strong Form Hypothesis holds that the creation of a psychotherapy privilege
will increase the number of patients visiting psychotherapists, encourage patients to
begin therapy earlier, and perhaps most significantly for this discussion, and reduce
9
the tendency of patients to with-hold information during psychotherapy. ' The
Strong Form Hypothesis is very similar to the previously identified public policy
arguments in support of mediation confidentiality. 97
The Strong Form Hypothesis was tested extensively by Daniel Shuman and
Myron Weiner in three surveys.95 The first tested the attitudes of participants before
and after the recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege in Texas. The second
survey compared responses in South Carolina and West Virginia before recognition
of the privilege to those in Texas after recognition. The third compared attitudes
toward confidentiality in Ontario, Canada, where there was no privilege, to those in
Quebec, Canada, where a general right to privacy covered psychotherapist-patient

Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 2.
Id. at 10 (quoting Advisory Committee's Notes to Proposed Rules, 56 F.R.D. 183, 242 (1972)).
Cantu, supra n. 16, at 385.
Shuman & Weiner, supra n. 50, at 33-37.
See supra text accompanying nn. 80-82.
There is an another method of examining the necessity of privilege. The analysis has been
variously defined as: humanitarian, see Green, supra n. 10, at 34; deontological, see Shuman & Weiner,
supra n. 50, at 5; or privacy, see Developments in the Law--Privileged Communications, 98 Harv. L. Rev.
1450, 1480-81 (1985) (hereinafter referred to as Note). The rationale behind this type of view is that the
Strong Form Hypothesis, and its derivatives, are too narrowly based on instrumental concerns, and do not
give sufficient weight to human values such as privacy, dignity, autonomy, intimacy, and individuality.
The logic is that privilege is important, not because relationships will falter in the absence of privilege,
but because it is inappropriate for society to intrude in this private sphere. Green, supra n. 10, at 34.
i have discounted this perspective for two reasons. First, it is ambiguous and self-serving. It
would protect a relationship with privilege merely by asserting it was an important relationship. See
related discussion supra Section II(A). Second, and specific to the question of a mediation privilege, until
mediator services are offered for altruistic purposes, they should be viewed as foremost an economic
activity. See Green, supra n. 10, at 35 ("While some mediators ...might assert that mediation promotes
individual autonomy, self-development, and emotional release - humanitarian values on which the zoneof-privacy based privileges rest - any general mediation privilege seems to fit more easily into the
instrumentalist-based group of privileges because, at bottom, it is defended as furthering the rendition of
professional [mediator] services").
98. See generally Shuman & Weiner, supra n. 50, at 77-113.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
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communications. Shuman and Weiner found no support for the Strong From
Hypothesis in any of their studies.
The Texas study sought to compare participant attitudes before and after the
state instituted a psychotherapist-patient privilege in 1979.99 The study attempted
to specifically address the contention that:
If the existence of a psychotherapist-patient privilege
removes disincentives to seeking psychotherapy,
there should be an increase in the number of persons
in psychotherapeutic treatment coincidental with a
privilege's enactment.'0 °
Researchers posited that an increase in the number of patients would result
in an increase in the number of insurance claims for psychotherapeutic treatment. t'
The study found that enactment of the privilege "had no measurable impact on
insurance financed psychotherapy.'10 2 There was no statistically significant change
in the number of claims filed before and after the enactment of the privilege.
The Jaffee Court held that confidentiality was a sine qua non for successful
psychiatric treatment. That argument mirrors the justification set forth by
proponents of mediation confidentiality.' 3 It strikes me that the issue is not whether
confidentiality protection encourages disclosure, but whether a lack of protection
would inhibit disclosure. If a lack of protection would not inhibit disclosure, there
is little reason for creating general mediation confidentiality protections. The Texas
study is very informative on this contention.
Texas lay respondents were asked about their willingness to disclose
information under three conditions: no mention of privilege, mention of privilege,
and statement of no privilege.'04 There was no significant difference in disclosure
between no mention of privilege and mention of privilege.'0 5 It is highly unlikely
that respondents were relying on the existence of a privilege otherwise known to
them. The study found that only one quarter of lay respondents knew or guessed that
there was an applicable privilege in Texas. °6 It seems reasonable to surmise that

99. Id. at 81. For the Texas study, questionnaires were distributed to 200 lay adult education students.
One hundred and twenty-one (sixty percent) were completed and returned. Id. at 82. Patient
questionnaires were distributed by thirty-one psychiatrists. Seventy-nine (fifty percent) were
anonymously completed and returned. Id. One hundred and eighty-six therapist questionnaires were sent
to members of the North Texas Psychiatric Society. Eighty-four (forty-five percent) were completed and
returned. Id. Judicial questionnaires were used as a guide for a group of Southern Methodist University
Law students who interviewed forty-eight of the fifty-six state and federal judges in Dallas County. Id.
100. Id. at 87.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 88.
103. See e.g. Freedman & Prigoff, supra n. 29.
104. Shuman & Weiner, supra n. 50, at 83.
105. Id.
106. Id. See also Miller, supra n. 24, at 783 (asserting that empirical studies support the contention
that few lay people are aware of protected relationships and that the candor of their communications in
a protected relationship is not influenced by the existence of a privilege).
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if a confidentiality privilege was an important concern for respondents, they would
ask to be informed about it. For the most part, they did not.)°7
The results further showed that lay persons were not restricted in
disclosures by the lack of privilege discussion or the general mention of privilege.0 8
Willingness to discuss all items dropped significantly under a no privilege
condition,'09 but I perceive this finding as a function of the lay person's perception
that the therapist would reveal information, as opposed to a lack of a specific legal
protection creating confidentiality. Although patients regarded confidentiality as
important, they looked to the character of the therapist rather than the law to ensure
confidentiality. "0 In general patients relied more heavily on the psychotherapist's
ethics than on a privilege statute."' Nearly forty percent of patients had withheld
information from their psychiatrist," 2 but no statistical relationship existed between
the lack of privilege and the withholding of information." 3 Lay persons displayed
"little concern about disclosure of information to insurance carriers, state agencies,
or potential employers, and [only] mild concern ...about release to a lawyer for
trial."' 14
The results of the South Carolina/West Virginia study were very similar to
those of the Texas study. There was no significant difference in disclosures under
conditions of no mention of privilege and mention of privilege, but there was a
significant drop when the condition was a statement of no privilege."' "There was
little concern about disclosure to insurance carriers, state agencies, and potential
employers, and [only] mild concern ...
about disclosure at trial."' 16 Both Texas and
South Carolina/West Virginia respondents indicated that the therapist's ethics and the
traditional confidentiality of the therapist-patient
relationship were of greater
7
importance than a law forbidding disclosure."
Shuman and Weiner also utilized results from studies in Quebec and
Ontario. As previously noted, Ontario had no privilege protecting psychotherapistpatient confidentiality, while Quebec did. While it was not statistically significant,

107. Shuman & Weiner, supra n.50, at I11.
108. Id. See also Daniel 0. Taube & Amiram Elwork, Researching the Effects of ConfidentialityLaw
on Patients'Self-Disclosures,21 Prof. Psychol. Res. and Prac. 72, 74 (1990) ("The results support the
hypothesis that current limitations on confidentiality in psychotherapy matter only to some patients and
in some circumstances").
109. Shuman & Weiner, supranote 50, at 83.
110. Id. at84.
111. Id. at 84. See also James C. Beck, When the Patient Threatens Violence: An EmpiricalStudy
of Clinical Practiceafter Tarasoff, 10 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychol. & L. 189, 190 (1982) (finding that
psychotherapy requires trust, not necessarily legal confidentiality).
112. Shuman & Weiner, supran. 50, at 84.
113. Id. at112.
114. Id. at 83. See also John McGuire, et al., The Adult Client's Conception of Confidentialityin the
TherapeuticRelationship, 16 Prof Psychol. Res. & Prac. 375,377 (1985) (finding that patients concerned
with privacy focused on the possibility that the therapist might reveal confidences to the employer,
family, or friends of the patient, not the courts).
115. Shuman & Weiner, supran. 50, at 89.
116. Id.
117. ld.at93. The authors also summarized the findings of other research to conclude that "[p]atients
indicated clearly that what was most important as a guarantee of confidentiality was their trust of the
psychiatrist as a person and a professional with an ethical duty to maintain confidentiality and not any
legal guarantee." Id. at I11.
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more Quebec patients withheld information from their therapists than Ontarian
patients. Respondents in both groups
"valued professional ethics above a statutory
8
guarantee of confidentiality.""
The premise that mediation needs confidentiality implicitly holds that the
existence of confidentiality is important to parties contemplating or using mediation
and that confidentiality causes parties to reveal information they would not reveal
in the absence of confidentiality. These enormous and fundamental assumptions are
not supported by the previous empirical evaluation in psychotherapist-patient
research, nor are they supported in the following attorney-client confidentiality
research.
2. Attorney-Client Confidentiality and Privilege
In 1962 the Yale Law Journal conducted research on the importance and
effect of attorney-client privilege rules.' 19 The primary purpose of the study was to
compare the privilege protection accorded to members of the bar to the protection
granted to other professions.1 20 Results showed that lawyers, significantly more than
laymen, believed that privilege encouraged free disclosure. 2' The results also
generated large questions as to how important attorney-client privilege protection
was to lay persons and how pervasive they understood that protection to be.
Approximately three-quarters of lay respondents understood, generally, that
lawyers would not disclose confidential matters."' A significant percentage of
respondents believed that lawyers would have an obligation to reveal confidential
communications under court questioning. 2 3 Perhaps most significantly the
respondents split almost evenly on the question of whether an outright elimination
ofthe attorney-client privilege would deter client disclosures. 2 4 Survey results show
that a substantial majority of lay persons would continue to use lawyers even if
secrecy were limited.'25 The attorney-client privilege is the oldest recognized form
of common law privilege. 26 In many ways it set the original standard for privileged

118. Id. at 102.
119. FunctionalOverlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implicationsfor the
Privileged CommunicationsDoctrine, 71 Yale L.J. 1226 (1962) (hereinafter referred to as Note). See
Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 351, 377-379 (1989) (succinctly
summarizing the results of the Yale study).
120. Zacharias, supra n. 119, at 377.
121. See Note, supra n. 119, at 1232.
122. Id. at 1239.
123. Id. at 1262.
124. Id. at 1236. See also Jonathan Auburn, Legal ProfessionalPrivilege:Law and Theory 67 (2000)
(The author discusses the fact that evolution of the attorney-client privilege, including an increasing
number of exceptions from that protection, have had no measurable effect on attorney-client relations.
Further, Auburn states that "there are many reasons to doubt whether the sky would fall and the
administration of justice be severely damaged if further exceptions to the privilege were recognized.
First, the privilege has existed for centuries. Its scope and operation have changed over this time, yet
there is nothing to suggest that this has had any effect on lawyer-client relations").
125. Zacharias, supra n. 119, at 378.
126. At least one authority would maintain that "[tihe earliest reference to any relational privilege.
is the refusal of Roman law to compel the testimony of an attorney against a client during the pendency
of a case." See Shuman & Weiner supra n. 50, at 49 (citing M. Radin, The Privilegeof Confidential
Communication Between Lawyer and Client, 16 Cal. L. Rev. 487, 488 (1928)).
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communications. Yet, at least in terms of fostering client disclosure of information,
the Yale study certainly challenges the assumption that the attorney-client
relationship needs privilege protection. 2 7 If the attorney-client relationship does not
need privilege to foster client disclosure of information, it follows that mediation
may not need a privilege to promote disclosures either.
In 1989 Professor Fred Zacharias conducted what he termed the "Tompkins
County Study on Confidentiality." ' 2s The purpose of the study was to attempt to
assess practices regarding attorney-client confidentiality, attorney understanding of
attorney-client confidentiality, and the perceptions of client understanding and
reliance on confidentiality. 29 About half of the lay respondents in the Tompkins
County Study predicted that they would withhold information from attorneys if no
firm obligation of confidentiality existed. 30 Nearly thirty percent of the clients
stated that they had given information to their attorney "that they would not have
given without a guarantee of confidentiality.. 13' It could be argued that these
findings create an empirical basis for establishing the necessity of confidentiality.
However, what respondents said and what they did were two different things.
Just over half the respondents said they would withhold information without
a firm obligation of confidentiality, but approximately seventy-three percent of the
lay respondents reported that their first attorneys never told them anything about
confidentiality.'32 If the attorney never discussed confidentiality, then there certainly
was no firm obligation of confidentiality extended to the client.'33 The combination
of these two response rates shows that clients say they want a firm obligation, but
that one is seldom offered. It follows that either clients are not disclosing to lawyers,
because no obligation has been given, or clients disclose even without the firm
obligation they say they require."'
The value of confidentiality presupposes that people will reveal information
if they believe that the information will be kept in confidence. People do not

127. Attorneys may have a significant interest in attorney-client confidentiality for the real and
perceived benefits it provides to the attorney. The attorney-client privilege can be asserted by the attorney
to protect himself or herself from compulsory testimony. The promise of general confidentiality, if made
by the attorney and even if inaccurately stated, may serve to promote a sense of trust between attorney
and client. There may also be an economic incentive. The existence of an attorney-client privilege may
allow attorneys to offer a level of secrecy in relationships with clients that attorneys may feel promotes
business relationships. See infra text accompanying n. 154.
128. See Zacharias, supra n. 119. The survey utilized the responses of 63 attorneys and 105 lay
respondents in Tompkins County, New York. Of the 105 lay respondents, 73 had consulted attorneys in
the past and will be referred to as "clients." Id. at 379.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 380.
131. Id. at 380-81.
132. Id. at 382-83. Approximately seventy-nine percent of clients claimed to know of general
confidentiality even in the absence of any explanation by the attorney. Id. It is also possible that some
of these lay respondents were informed about confidentiality by their attorney but did not remember it
after the fact. If that is the case, it could certainly be inferred that confidentiality was not a primary
concern of clients during consultations with attorneys.
133. It is possible that clients had a general awareness of an attorney-client privilege through its
frequent mention in movies and on television.
134. 1believe the answer is the latter. Approximately seventy-two percent of attorneys reported that
they felt they would get the same information from clients even if they never informed clients about
confidentiality. Zacharias, supra n. 119, at 385 n. 172.
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necessarily act in accordance with this principle. Respondents in the Tompkins
County study admitted that eleven percent of the time they did not disclose
information to attorneys when there was a privilege and when almost eighty percent
of the respondents were generally aware of that privilege.'35 It may well be that this
reported percentage is lower than the percentage actually withholding such
information.
"Over forty-two percent of the surveyed clients [believed]
confidentiality to be absolute."' 36 However, only twenty percent believed that
"attorneys as a matter of practice always keep information confidential." 3 7 Viewing
this last response from the opposite perspective reveals that eighty percent of the
clients surveyed believed that attorneys, at least sometimes, revealed what should
have been confidential information. Assuming that party beliefs in mediation are
similar to the attitudes shown in the Tompkins County study, it is likely that
mediation parties will withhold information even if a privilege exists.
The Tompkins County study identified another concern that must be
addressed when attempting to empirically determine the "need" for confidentiality,
non-lawyers (and perhaps lawyers) were unclear as to exactly what confidentiality
meant. 3
This concern is analogous to mediation and its oft-cited promise that
"whatever is said in this room stays in this room." 39 Although mediators may tell
the parties that the proceedings are confidential, the mediator's promises do not
create an evidentiary privilege or other protection that will be judicially
recognized. 40 Approximately seventy-two percent of Tompkins County attorneys
surveyed admitted that they told clients only generally that all communications were
confidential.' 4' Only about twenty-eight percent acknowledged to their clients that
exceptions to the privilege existed.4 2 Only one client surveyed recalled any specific
mention of any exception. 43 Almost sixty-five percent of the attorneys thought that
44
more than three-quarters of their clients believed confidentiality to be absolute.

135. Id. at 386.
136. Id. at 383.
137. Id.
138. People may also be unclear as to when confidentiality protection actually exists. See Note, supra
n. 119, at 1255-1262 (finding that sixty percent of subjects felt that the absence of legal confidentiality
would seriously hamper accountant-client discussions). There was no accountant-client privilege.
139. Recently I had the opportunity to attend a lecture featuring a very accomplished and respected
mediator. This person has been involved in literally hundreds of mediations, several of which were
prominently featured in local or national media. He served as the mediator for a simulation. The
simulation was conducted under an abbreviated time frame. The mediator cut his opening marks short.
He explained confidentiality as "whatever is said in this room, stays in this room." After the simulation
I asked him how he normally explains confidentiality, and I explained my concern with his
misrepresentation. His answer was that, time permitting, he would have taken the parties through an indepth analysis of confidentiality rules and their exceptions. I have no reason to disbelieve him, but I find
it interesting that his default approach to mediation confidentiality was still "whatever is said in this room
stays in this room."
140. Ehrhardt, supra n. 25, at 92. However, at least one author takes the position that mediation has
an absolute guarantee of confidentiality. See Kentra, supra n. 81, at 722 ("In addition to being futureoriented, flexible, economical, and less stressful than litigation, mediation ensures confidentiality, which
is one of the most attractive and powerful attributes of the mediation process").
141. Zacharias, supra n. 119, at 386.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 387.
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Nearly half of the clients believed the law required absolute confidentiality. 45 While
this view was not voiced by the attorneys surveyed, it may be the case that there was
a professional fear that clients would not use lawyer services as readily or frequently
46
if the exceptions to confidentiality protection were understood and explained.
3. Therapeutic Communications
A significant number of respondents in attorney-client confidentiality
research believed confidentiality protection to be absolute. There is no mechanism,
including the UMA Privilege Against Disclosure, that can create complete
confidentiality. 14 Research on therapeutic communications has addressed the
question of whether lay persons would reveal information, under the promise of
confidentiality, if they were made aware of limitations to that protection.
In 1986, two behavioral scientists conducted a study to assess the public's
knowledge and attitude regarding the confidentiality of therapeutic

145. Id. The issue that raises perhaps the most concern is that a significant percentage of attorneys
surveyed knowingly allowed their clients to operate under misunderstandings of confidentiality. "What
makes this overstatement worse is that the same lawyers know or believe that their clients misunderstand
the scope of confidentiality. [About forty-two percent] of the lawyers surveyed... thought less than half
their clients understand confidentiality and its scope." Id.
146. At least one author would take this position a step further. "It is hard to resist the conclusion that
the law of privilege is built on active deceit. Lawyers either do not discuss this issue with clients and
foster an assumption of absolute confidentiality, or actively assert that this is the case. They never tell
their clients about the limits to confidentiality." Auburn, supra n. 124, at 75. See Daniel R. Fischel,
Lawyers and Confidentiality,65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1998) (arguing that this type of deceit is based on
financial motives of lawyers by showing that: "[alnother way to ask why encouraging communications
with the legal profession is so important is to inquire who benefits from these communications. Stated
this way, the questions answers itself: confidentiality benefits lawyers because it increases the demand
for legal services. The legal profession, not clients or society as a whole, is the primary beneficiary of
confidentiality rules").
147. See infra text accompanying nn. 296-327.
The UMA clearly recognizes that its Privilege Against Disclosure will not provide complete
confidentiality. The Act anticipates courts balancing the needs for information against the parties' need
for protection against involuntary disclosure under certain circumstances. See U.M.A. § 7. Section seven
provides in pertinent part:
(b) There is no privilege under Section 5 (Privilege
Against Disclosure) if a court, administrative agency, or
arbitration panel finds, after a hearing in camera, that the
party seeking discovery or the proponent of the evidence
has shown that the evidence is not otherwise available, that
there is a need forthe evidence that substantially outweighs
the importance of the policy favoring the protection of
confidentiality, and the mediation communication is sought
or offered in:
(1)a court proceeding involving a felony;
(2) or a proceeding to prove a claim or defense to reform or
avoid liability on a contract arising out of the mediation,
except as otherwise provided in subsection (c).
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communications. 4" Ninety-six percent of those surveyed wanted to be apprised of
information pertaining to confidentiality, 4 9 but only thirty-three percent of
responding psychologists orally informed clients of possible legal or ethical
limitations on confidentiality. 5 Seventy-five percent of all respondents felt that
their psychologists maintained confidentiality to facilitate the therapeutic
relationship and to maintain trust.' 5' Sixty-nine percent of respondents believed that
psychologists considered everything discussed in the context of psychotherapy to be
confidential.' 52 Forty-two percent identified that there would be a "negative impact"
if they were told before the first session that certain information was not
confidential. 53 The study concluded that although "subjects desire[d] to be told of
the limitations to confidentiality, the majority would react negatively to such
information . . . .'" The researchers put it best when summarizing their data,
"[h]ence the clinician is thrust between Charydbis and Scylla - clients desire to be
but when told, they may not subsequently
told of the limitations to confidentiality,
"5
participate in psychotherapy. 1
A separate study was conducted to empirically measure the effects of
confidentiality laws on patients' self-disclosures in psychotherapy.' 56 The results of
this study support those of the 1986 study. The results of the study showed that
"patients who were more informed about the limits to confidentiality admitted to
having fewer socially unacceptable thoughts and behaviors... than did uninformed
' The study concluded that laws that limit privacy protection for
patients ...
confidentiality may discourage certain patients from being candid in the first place
and that such laws may actually hinder the treatment they were intended to
facilitate."' To promote patient disclosures, it may be better to have no privilege
than one with exceptions, especially if patients are aware of those exceptions.

148. See generally David J. Miller & Mark H. Thelen, Knowledge and Beliefs About Confidentiality
in Psychotherapy, 17 Prof. Psychol. Res. & Prac. 15 (1986). The scientists obtained questionnaire
responses from high school students, undergraduate psychology students, former clients from a
community mental health center, and former clients from a university counseling center. Id. at 15.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 17.
151. Id. at 18.
152. Id. at 15.
153. Id. at 18. An additional twenty-seven percent stated they would have ambivalent feelings if
informed of the limitations on confidentiality protection, e.g. "It might make one hesitant at first ....
I don't know." Id. "Twenty-one percent said they would react positively, e.g. 'I would feel that the
therapist was being honest."' Id. But see Gibbs L. Arthur, Jr. & Carl D. Swanson, Confidentialityand
PrivilegedCommunication9-10 (Am. Counseling Assn. 1993) ("The general public, clients, and mental
health professionals appear to share an expectation of privacy in the counseling relationship; clients prefer
to know in advance about confidentiality limitations; the degree ofconfidentiality assurances seem neither
to enhance nor diminish later client disclosiveness; and findings to date are mixed and inconclusive about
whether client knowledge of confidentiality limitations at thebeginning ofcounseling inhibits subsequent
disclosiveness").
154. Miller & Thelen, supra n. 148, at 18.
155. Id.
156. Taube & Elwork, supra n. 108, at 72-75.
157. Id. at 74.
158. Id.
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C. Reason and Experience:
"Reason" under the Wigmore Analysis
In addition to its empirical analysis under the "experience" standard, the
Jaffee court also cited a variety of public and private policy concerns supporting
recognition of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 5 9 These fall under the "reason"
standard, as they are societal justifications for the creation or recognition of a
privilege. According to the Court, the psychotherapist-patient privilege facilitates
effective treatment by providing an atmosphere in which the patient can speak freely,
without fear of disclosure. 6 ° Publicly, the privilege facilitates the "provision of
appropriate treatment for individuals suffering from the effects of a mental or
emotional health problem."'' The Court was clear that its past privilege decisions
have supported a privilege when it served a public good of transcendental
importance.' 62 The question is whether a mediation privilege would serve such a
public good.
The utilitarian analysis for whether or not a privilege should be created or
applied to protect a public good has consistently been the Wigmore analysis for
privilege. 63 The following Wigmore analysis draws on some of the empirical
findings previously discussed and some private and public policy concerns relevant
to individual mediation disputes or practice procedures. A proposed privilege must
satisfy each step of the analysis in order to be recognized. The Privilege Against
Disclosure in the UMA fails each step of the following Wigmore analysis:
1. The communication must originate in confidence that it
will not be disclosed;
2. The element of confidentiality must be essential to the full
and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the
parties;
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered; and

159. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10-12.
160. Id. at 10.
161. Id.at 11.
162. Id. (quoting Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)) ("The purpose of the attorney-client
privilege is to 'encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby
promote broader public interests in the observance of the law and administration ofjustice'). See also
Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53 (justifying a modified spousal privilege because it "furthers the important public
interest in marital harmony").
163. See e.g, Kentra, supra n. 81, at 728 ("Traditionally, when determining a claim of privilege, the
courts have employed the four-part Wigmore balancing test." .... "Inthe context of a mediation
privilege, courts would likely apply this same four-part test"); Weinberg, supra n. 29, at 3 (identifying
that the standard test for the prerequisite for creation of a common-law privilege is the satisfaction of the
four-part Wigmore analysis); Green, supran. 10, at 31 (identifying the Wigmore analysis as the standard
"utilitarian calculus" for recognition of a common-law privilege); Engelbart, supra n. 81, at 78 ("When
considering whether or not to create a common-law privilege, the court uses the four-part Wigmore
balancing test").
To see how the federal courts use the Wigmore analysis in examining the "reason" component
of Rule 501, see Nixon, 418 U.S. 683; Macaluso, 618 F.2d at 51. For a view of how state courts use the
Wigmore analysis see Grossberg, 1998 WL 117975 at *2; Driscoll, 193 N.W.2d at 856.
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4. The injury to the relation caused by disclosure of the
communication must be greater than the benefit gained.'6
Step 1: The communication must
originate in confidence that it will not be disclosed
The question of whether a mediation communication arises in confidence
that it will not be disclosed is obviously circular. If the mediator promises
confidentiality, and the parties believe and accept that promise, then Step 1 is
satisfied. If no promise is made by the mediator, or if the promise is not believed or
accepted by one or more parties, then the communication fails Step 1. At least one
author, while critical of a mediation privilege generally, would admit that Step 1
would likely be satisfied.' 65 I do not agree and my position is supported by
analogous empirical evidence.
Currently there is no way of knowing what percentage of mediators inform
parties of confidentiality or what percentage of parties rely upon that information in
choosing to make disclosures during mediation. There is simply no empirical
evidence on either of these specific points. However, the Tompkins County study
revealed that approximately seventy-three percent of the lay respondents reported
that their first attorneys never told them anything about confidentiality.' 66 In a
separate study, sixty-seven percent of responding psychologists never orally
informed clients of possible legal or ethical limitations on confidentiality.' 67 If these
percentages are similar to those of mediators, then it is likely that there is no
guarantee of confidentiality being made that can be relied upon.' 68 It is also likely
that parties to mediation may not be relying on the mediator's promises of
confidentiality, even if made. The Tompkins County study found that while fortytwo percent of the surveyed clients believed attorney-client confidentiality to be
absolute,' 69 only about twenty percent believed that "attorneys as a matter of practice
always keep information confidential."' 7
It is possible that parties could be relying on mediation confidentiality
learned through some other source when no promise or explanation was given by the
mediator. Such reliance is doubtful for two inter-related reasons. First, currently
only twenty-five states have general mediation confidentiality statutes of any kind. ''
At the risk of being obvious, that means half of the states have no general protection.
Second, laypersons do not appear to be generally aware of the existence of legal

164. Wigmore, supra n. 19, at § 2285.
165. Green, supra n. 10, at 32.
166. Zacharias, supra n. 119, at 383.
167. Miller& Thelen, supra n. 148, at 17.
168. It is possible that a higher percentage of mediators discuss confidentiality with clients, given the
strong focus on discussion of confidentiality in opening statements provided through many mediation
trainings.
169. Zacharias, supra n. 119, at 383.
170. Id.
171. U.M.A. Reporter's Notes for § 5(l), at 20 (labeled 2. The privilege structure).
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confidentiality protections, especially in areas of more recently developed
privileges.'72
Step 2: The element of confidentiality must be essential to the
full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties
This step of the Wigmore analysis requires that confidentiality must be
essential to a full and satisfactory maintenance of the relationship between the
parties. This consideration assumes that the relationship at issue should be
maintained and will not be so without confidentiality. If the relationship should not
be maintained, then there is no need for privileged confidentiality.
Mediation can apply to a virtually limitless variety of disputes and
"relationships," some of which will not, should not, or cannot be maintained. There
is likely no ongoing relationship between a plaintiff and defendant in a personal
injury lawsuit who utilize mediation prior to trial. Courts have refused to extend
73
spousal privileges to couples who were still married, but irreparably separated.
There may be relationships that cannot be preserved. 74 It is not possible to
determine that there is a common relationship that must be maintained between all
parties using mediation. Absent such a relationship, the Privilege Against Disclosure
must fail Step 2 of the Wigmore analysis.

172. See supra text accompanying n. 114. People may be more generally aware of confidential
relationships that have existed for longer periods of time and that have been recognized in all states. See
Zacharias, supra n. 119, at 382-282 ("Of the clients who said their attorney told them nothing about
confidentiality [72.9%], 79.1% of clients claimed to know of confidentiality nonetheless"). Id.
See also Freedman & Prigoff, supra n. 29, at 42 ("The argument is made that mediation is
conducted everywhere without a privilege and it has not really suffered. This argument is flawed by the
fact that most mediation is now done under the assumption that communications are privileged under the
law, even if they are not really privileged"). With all due respect to these authors, I am unclear how they
arrive at such a conclusion. This quote cites a then ongoing survey sent to 288 community mediation
centers. The footnote lists some of the categories of questions posed to these centers, but does not
identify any response data. The cite concludes by stating that "A summary report and analysis of the
survey is now in progress. It should be noted that not all of the programs responded to the survey, so the
results are, to some degree, incomplete." Id. at 42 n. 21. Perhaps the authors had reviewed, but not
finalized analysis of,data leading them to believe that the majority of parties to mediation believed in the
existence of privilege protection. They do not provide any such empirical evidence in support of their
position.
173. See In re Witness Before GrandJury, 791 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that where a
couple is permanently separated but legally wed, the privilege is not applicable); US. v. Fulk, 816 F.2d
1202, 1204 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that when husband and wife were permanently separated at the time
of the communication, the privilege is not applicable).
174. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 41 ("When one spouse is willing to testify against another in a criminal
proceeding- whatever the motivation - there is probably little in the way of marital harmony for the
privilege to preserve"). See also Weinberg, supra n. 29, at 29 (noting that spousal privileges do not
survive annulment because, with annulment, there never was a marital relation to be preserved or
protected).
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Step 3: The relation must be one which the
opinion of the community must be sedulously fostered
Step 3 is the most nebulous concern of the Wigmore analysis. In the
context of the mediation process the "relation" which must be sedulously fostered
could refer to any of several possibilities. At a minimum, the mediation process has
a relationship between the disputing parties, a relationship between the mediator and
the parties, and the relationship that is the mediation process itself.171 It is difficult
to establish that society would recognize any of these as needing to be sedulously
fostered.
There is a variety of relationships between the individual parties in
mediation. The question is whether the base relationship of the parties is one that
society would or should protect by privilege. Frequently some relationships using
mediation will not need to be maintained at all, such as adversaries in "one-shot"
civil disputes. There are other forms of mediation where it would appear that the
relationship of the parties may be sufficient to warrant privilege protection. Parentchild mediation comes readily to mind. Few would argue that thi'; relationship is not
an important, if not paramount, relationship in society. Yet there is no federal
parent-child confidentiality privilege. 76 Family mediation is another example, 77 yet
there is no federal sibling privilege protection. 17' The Supreme Court has even
refused to recognize a blanket privilege shielding secret service assigned to the
president of the United States from revealing communications made by the president
in their presence.' 79 There is no privilege protection for these types of relationships
when they exist outside of the mediation process. There is no reason to accord them
privilege protection merely when they are addressed in the mediation process.
It is even more difficult to argue that society would, or should, sedulously
protect the relationship between mediator and party. The primary problem with such
an argument is that there is little consensus on what that relationship is. A mediator
may serve the role of problem solver, although without binding authority, in an
evaluative mediation.'8" The role of the mediator may be a source of empowerment
The mediator may be
for the parties in a Transformative style of mediation.'
responsible for creating communication, or repaiiing damaged channels of
communication, between the parties in a facilitative mediation. Mediators may

175. The relationship that is the mediation process itself includes the simultaneous relationships
between the parties, between the mediator and an individual party, between the mediator and the parties
collectively, and between the mediation process and society as a whole.
176. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 22 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
177. By "family mediation" I mean mediation designed to address conflict between siblings.
178. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 22 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
179. See generallyNixon, 418 U.S. 683.
180. See generally Leonard L. Riskin, UnderstandingMediators' Orientations, Strategies, and
Techniques: A Gridfor the Perplexed,I Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 7 (1996) (creating and defining the terms
"evaluative" and "facilitative" mediation).
18 1. See generally Robert A. Baruch Bush & Joseph P. Folger, The Promise of Mediation (I st ed.,
Josey-Bass 1994).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2001/iss2/1

28

2001]

Reich: Reich: Call for Intellectual Honesty
A CallforIntellectualHonesty

perform all of these roles in a single mediation. It is difficult, if not impossible, to
specifically identify what is the basis of the mediator-party relationship." 2
It is also difficult to define what the mediator-party relationship is because
there is little consensus on what it takes to be recognized as a mediator. The other
historically recognized privileges largely have a licensure consideration.8 3 There
is some standard defining the legal status of those seeking to utilize the privilege. 8 4
This is not true in mediation."'

182. It could be argued that the nature of the relationship can be found in a general definition of the
mediation process. Mediation could be defined simply as a mechanism using a third party to facilitate
resolution of a dispute. Under this definition the role of the mediator is to provide assistance to carry out
that objective. However, even adefinition as innocuous as this would not satisfy all concerns. I seriously
doubt that the Transformative proponents would agree that the resolution of adispute is necessarily a goal
of the mediation process. There is no uniform basis underlying the mediator-party relationship.
183. See Nature of the Professional Relationship Required Under Privileged Communication Rule,
24 Iowa L. Rev. 538 (1949) (hereinafter referred to as Note).
Traditional notions of privilege require the following for a professional relationship warranting
privilege protection:
1. There must be one who is legally a doctor, lawyer, or minister;
2. At the time the communication in question was made, he must have been acting in his
professional capacity, and;
3. The person making the communication, if in possession of his faculties, must have
regarded the professional man as his doctor, lawyer, or minister.
Id.
A licensure requirement may strictly determine whether a particular privilege may be enforced.
See Scott N. Stone & Ronald S. Liebman, Testimonial Privileges 385 (Shepard's/McGraw Hill 1983)
(identifying that dentists, chiropractors, Christian Science practitioners, and veterinarians have not been
protected by assertion of the physician-patient privilege). See also Wigmore, supra n. 19, at § 2382
(identifying that a veterinary surgeon and pharmacist would not be protected by the physician-patient
privilege, but that a dentist or practitioner of any "reputable medical profession" should be).
The exception to the general rule requiring licensure is the priest-penitent privilege. It does
not have a licensure requirement and courts are likely reluctant to impose such a requirement on religious
officials due to First Amendment concerns. At least one court has defined "clergyman," for purposes of
the privilege, as "a minister, priest, rabbi, or other similar functionary of a religious organization, or an
individual reasonably believed to be so by the person consulting them." In re Grand Jury Investigation,
918 F.2d 374, 380 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting proposed Fed. R. Evid. 506,56 F.R.D. 141 (1972)). Another
court has suggested that while it was reluctant to impose a strict licensure requirement on clergy, it would
not apply the privilege to "clergy" of a "mail order church" formed for the sole purpose of attempting to
avoid taxation. U.S. v. Dube, 820 F.2d 886, 889-90 (7th Cir. 1987).
184. See Scottish Law Commission, Discussion Paper No. 92: Confidentiality in Family Mediation
124-25 (Edinburgh 1991) ("We would suggest that if the view is accepted that the creation of a privilege
is a matter of importance, justified only on the grounds of compelling public policy, it is not appropriate
that one of the conditions for the application of a privilege should be the mere assertion by an individual
or agency that he or she or it provides mediation services. It appears to us that it may be preferable that
the application of a statutory privilege should be controlled by a system of official approval of the
organization or individuals to whose mediation services the privilege is to attach").
185. See Nancy H. Rogers & Craig A. McEwen, Mediation: Law. Policy, Practice 115 (Law. Coop.
Publg. Co. 1989) ("Probably the key difference among mediation privileges, and the issue on which there
is little agreement among commentators, is in the definition of'mediation.' The varying approaches taken
by the states reflect not only a fear that too much valuable information will be lost if the definition is too
broad, but also a possibly conflicting desire to encourage mediation in a variety of formats. Unlike the
privilege for lawyers and psychiatrists, the mediation privilege [would be] applied to an unlicensed
profession").
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The UMA defines a mediator as an individual who conducts a mediation. 1
The UMA defines mediation as "a process in which a mediator facilitates
communication and negotiation between parties to assist them in reaching a
voluntary agreement regarding their dispute." 87 Put more simply, and assuming
that there is a recorded agreement to mediate,' virtually any person helping to
resolve a dispute is a mediator engaged in mediation. Such a broad definition of
mediation might certainly include 189some types of negotiation that run contrary to
traditional public policy concerns.
New privileges "are not lightly created nor expansively construed."" ° In a
society that has refused to recognize new privileges for protection of "legislative
acts" by members of state legislatures,' 9' a Privilege Against Disclosure of academic
peer review materials, 92 a privilege for journalists and their sources,' 93 a privilege
for editors and reporters,' 94 a privilege for scientific researchers,' 95 and the previously
discussed decision in Nixon which denied privilege to communications made by the
president of the United States in the presence of secret service agents,196 it is difficult
to imagine that a blanket privilege would be desired or enforced for anyone simply
calling themselves a mediator or claiming to have used the mediation process.
The third type of relationship that must be considered is that of the
mediation process itself. To create a privilege for mediation, society must approve
or accept mediation as a process. That acceptance does not appear to exist. There
are several sources that maintain mediation actually causes detriments for users and
society as a whole. Some critics argue that users of mediation are subject to "second
class" justice. 9 7 Others argue that unsophisticated users may lack awareness of their
legal rights or the ability to walk away from the mediation process.'" At least one
person has argued that the confidential settlement of certain types of disputes
through mediation masks true risks or costs to society. "' Others would go so far as
to maintain that an out-of-court settlement, by definition, is always less than full

186. U.M.A. § 3(5).
187. Id. § 3(3).
188. See U.M.A. § 4(a).
189. As an example, it was reported that the prime evidence in a trial on racketeering charges against
twenty-one defendants was testimony about a "mediation" by the "Boys from New Jersey" called to settle
a controversy between rival gangs claiming ownership of a Florida investment operation. Rogers &
McEwen,supra n. 184, at 115-6 (citing "Jersey Boys"Mediate a DixieMob Dispute,Newark Star Ledger
(July 22, 1987)).
190. See e.g. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710.
191. See U. S. v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989).
192. See U. of Pa., 493 U.S. at 189.
193. The seminal case for a journalist-source privilege is Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665. Branzburg
rejected the privilege on constitutional grounds. However, at least one federal court has recognized a
limited version of the privilege. See U. S. v. Cuthbertson, 651 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1981).
194. See e.g. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
195. See Wright v. Jeep Corp., 547 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
196. See Nixon, 418 U.S. 683.
197. See e.g. The Politics of Informal Justice (Richard L. Abel ed., Acad. Press 1982); Jerold S.
Auerbach, Justice Without Law? (Oxford Press 1983).
198. See e.g. Stephen B. Goldberg, et al., Dispute Resolution 490 (Little, Brown & Co. 1985).
199. See generally Aseem Mehta, Student Author, Resolving EnvironmentalDisputes in the HushHush World of Mediation: A Guideline for Confidentiality, 10 Geo. J. Leg. Ethics 521 (1997).
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justice.200 These commentators certainly cast doubt on the idea that society is
prepared to recognize the legitimacy and benefits of mediation and to accord it
privilege protection.
It is difficult to accord privilege to the mediation process for another reason.
Other privileges have been recognized or protected because of their clearly defined
goals,2' but there is no consensus as to the goal of mediation. Mediation is
frequently used as a settlement tool, yet few authors assert that settlement is the
primary goal of mediation.20 2 At least two authors argue that the goals of mediation
should be empowerment of the parties through valuing personal strength and
compassion for others. 203 Another would maintain that the goal of the mediation
process is to allow the parties to fird a resolution that suits them, one not constrained
by societal approval or legal remedies. 204 At least one author surmises that the
primary interest in mediation is the privacy of dispute resolution.2 0 5 Finally, a body
of work seems to contend that the goal of mediation is a voluntary decision entered
into by parties with full information generated by a frank discussion of interests.2 6
This final argument implies that confidentiality fosters full disclosure which, in turn,
creates fully reasoned decisions. This argument brings us full circle to the original
problem for those advocating a mediation privilege, there is no empirical evidence

200. See Green, supra n. 10, at 83 (citing Rifkin, Mediation From a Feminist Perspective: Promise
and Problems, 2 Law & Inequality 21 (1984)).
201. See Trammel, 445 U.S. 40 (identifying the specific goals of priest-penitent, attorney-client, and
physician-patient privileges).
202. See Making Sense of Rules ofPrivilege Under the Structural (l)logic of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1339, 1356-7 (1992) (hereinafter referred to as Note) ("[T]he fundamental
nature of mediator-party relationship does not hinge on complete confidentiality of communications; it
hinges on dispute resolution"); Eric R. Galton & Kimberlee K. Kovach, Texas ADR: A Futureso Bright
We Gotta Wear Shades, 31 St. Mary's L.J. 949, 957 (2000) ("A primary objective of these alternative
processes is to provide parties with assistance in moving beyond barriers to settlement"); Alan Kirtley,
The Mediation Privilege 's Transition from Theory to Implementation: Designing a Mediation Privilege
Standard to Protect Mediation Participants, the Process and the Public Interest, 1995 J. of Dis. Res. 1,
9 (1995) (arguing that mediation proceedings are undertaken with the goal that the disputing parties will
reach a mutually agreed upon settlement that satisfies the interest of all parties); Patrick D. Pinkston,
Transforming Mediators: Ensuring that Clients Get What They Pay For (2001) (unpublished LL.M.
thesis, University of Missouri, on file with the author) (arguing that to the degree parties want mediators
to help settle disputes, mediators have a responsibility to oblige).
203. See generally Baruch Bush & Folger, supra n. 181.
204. Deborah R. Sundermann, The Dilemma of Regulating Mediation, 22 Hous. L. Rev. 841, 847
(1985). See also Christopher H. Macturk, Student Author, Confidentiality in Mediation: The Best
Protection Has Exceptions, 19 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 411,414 (1995) (quoting Stephen B. Goldberg, et al.,
Dispute Resolution 92 (Little, Brown & Co. 1985) )(arguing that the mediation process is "above all
'better suited to tailoring outcomes to the needs of the parties"').
205. Green, supra n. 10, at 4-5 ("It is the parties' interest in private dispute resolution that is the
justification for the process in the first place.") See also Freedman & Prigoff, supra n. 29, at 38 (noting
that "[p]rivacy is an incentive for many to choose mediation." "[T]he option presented by the mediator
to settle disputes quietly and informally is often a primary motivator for parties choosing this process").
206. See e.g. Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 441,445 (1984) (asserting that
parties need to be frank with each other and with a mediator for effective mediation); Engelbart, supra
n. 81, at 76 ("Mediation is designed to encourage the parties to discuss relevant issues, facts, interests,
and emotions. Promoting frank and honest discourse between the parties and the mediator allows for [the
creation of broad solutions]. The mediator uses the blanket promise of confidentiality to promote freeflowing exchange. As a result, parties' reveal personal and business secrets, share deep-seated feelings
about others, and make admissions of fact and law").
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that supports the contention that confidentiality creates a greater degree of
disclosure.
Followed to finality, the basis of the last argument is that a belief in
confidentiality would foster complete disclosure. The problem is that the exchange
of information does not seem to follow this rationale. Respondents in the Tompkins
County study admitted that eleven percent of the time they did not disclose
information to attorneys when there was a privilege" 7 even when almost eighty
percent of the respondents knew of the privilege. 8 Shuman and Weiner found that,
2
even when a privilege existed, Canadian patients withheld information. "' If
respondents were fully informed of the limitations to confidentiality processions, it
is likely that they would disclose even less.21
Step 4: The injury to the relation caused by
disclosure of the communication must be greater than the benefit gained
Step 4 of Wigmore's analysis requires that the injury to the relation caused
by disclosure of a mediation communication must be greater than the benefit gained
(by availability for use in litigation).2 ' Proponents of a mediation privilege cannot
fashion a viable argument on this point because there is no empirical basis upon
which to make such an argument.21 2
Eileen Friedman answered Step 4 by asserting that "the detriment to the
mediation process that results from the loss of confidentiality is so great that it
should outweigh the benefits in any individual case for disclosure of statements or
records made in mediation., 21 3 This position, however, is simply a restatement of
the standard in question, not a basis for deciding the argument. This is nothing more
than a return to the general mantra that mediation needs confidentiality and that
without confidentiality parties would not make the level of disclosure necessary to
carry out effective mediation. That belief is not supported by the empirical
evidence.2" 4 Absent empirical evidence, mediation privilege proponents cannot
substantiate that the damage caused by disclosure outweighs the value of use at trial

207. Zacharias, supra n. 119, at 386.
208. Id. at 383.
209. Shuman & Weiner, supra n. 50, at 102.
210. Miller & Thelen, supra n. 148, at 18.
211. Friedman, supra n. 81, at 209.
212. The Step 4 deck is stacked against those asserting a mediation privilege when empirical validation
is required. See Auburn, supran. 124, at 65 ("[T]he confidentiality side of the privilege equation will
usually be a benefit that is speculative in nature. This may be in contrast to a detriment, in the form of
evidence denied, that is real and imminent").
At least one author is skeptical that courts would find that a mediation privilege satisfies step
4. Sec Green, supra n. 10, at 34 ("[Gliven the unwillingness of courts to strike the balance between
injury to the relationship and benefit to the justice system in favor of executive privilege and reporter's
privilege, it is doubtful that courts will conclude that the balancing of interests called for by the fourth
of the Wigmore conditions comes out in favor of a mediation privilege").
213. Friedman, supra n. 81, at 209.
214. See Shuman & Weiner, supra n. 50, at 83; Note, supra n. 119, at 1236; Kevin Gibson,
Confidentiality in Mediation: A Moral Reassessment, 1992 J.of Dis. Res. 25, 41 (1992) (stating that
research by the American Bar Association demonstrated that open, or non-confidential, mediations are
as successful as confidential mediations when measured by settlement rate).
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because they cannot substantiate that a lack of privilege would cause a decrease in
disclosures.
The UMA Privilege Against Disclosure fails all four steps of the Wigmore
analysis. 25 This failure is significant because the Wigmore analysis analyzes
whether a relationship is sufficient in the public interest or perception to warrant
privilege protection. If it is not, it should not be accorded privilege status because
to do so would decrease the protection for relationships truly deserving privilege.

215. But see Kirtley, supra n. 202, at 15-19 (arguing that a mediation privilege would pass the first
three steps of the Wigmore analysis, and could be drafted so as to satisfy the fourth).
I do not agree with Professor Kirtley. His conclusions largely mirror the generally held
mediation and confidentiality beliefs, as opposed to being supported by any empirical evidence. Kirtley
maintains that step I is satisfied because "we have seen that mediation predominantly occurs in private
settings and under circumstances in which the participants have agreed not to disclose their
communications. Moreover, it is likely the mediator will have told the parties their discussions are
confidential." Id.at 16. This conclusion rests entirely upon the parties having an original confidence that
their disclosures will not be disclosed. We cannot assume that mediators discussed confidentiality. If
the mediators are similar to the lawyers in the Tompkins County Study, it is likely that they did not
discuss confidentiality with the parties. See supratext accompanying n. 140. It is then unlikely that an
original confidence was ever created.
Kirtley argues that step 2 is satisfied simply because "the overwhelming weight of scholarly
authority supports the proposition that confidentiality is essential to the functioning of mediation."
Kirtley, supra n. 202, at 16. As previously discussed, it is more accurate to say that the vast majority of
scholarly weight asserts that confidentiality is important to mediation, not that it demonstrates any
empirical support for such a contention.
Kirtley argues that step 3 is satisfied because, in addition to the scholarly support he cited in
step 2, "the best evidence of public opinion as to whether mediation relationships ought to be fostered is
the flurry of legislative and court rule activity creating mediation privileges .... " Id. at 17. However,
legislation is not necessarily indicative of public opinions, it may merely be the result of an effective
lobby by a small group having an interest in a particular subject. See Wigmore, supra n. 19, at § 2380
(discussing the physician-patient privilege and noting "[tihe real support for the privilege seems to be
mainly the weight of professional medical opinion pressing upon the legislature"). See also Miller, supra
n. 24, at 787 (quoting Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom 1494 (2d ed., Antheneum 1973)) ("There
does seem to be a correlation between the existence of a privilege and the degree of political influence
of the beneficiaries. Fundamental privileges in Americanj urisprudence protect lawyers, doctors, religious
leaders, and the State from being forced to reveal information. Furthermore, 'the vast majority of new
privileges have been created by statute, a process certainly requiring the exercise of political power'").
Kirtley briefly discusses the contention that "the existence of evidentiary privileges is based
on political power." Kirtley, supran. 202, at 18. He dismisses this argument by attempting to rationalize
that broad societal interests may still be carried out, perhaps inadvertently, when legislation is a function
of small special interest groups. "At the extreme, the power rationale questions the legitimacy of all
privileges. But to acknowledge that power may underlie privileges is not to say that valuable social
interests may not also be involved." Id. It is precisely this type of argument that underlies many of the
positions of proponents of a mediation privilege. A privilege may have been created because it carries
out a societal good.. .but maybe not. Mediation may need confidentiality...but maybe not. Confidentiality
may increase disclosure...but maybe not. In order to resolve this uncertainty we must look to empirical
evidence, otherwise we just have competing opinions. Mere opinions are not sufficient to justify the
creation of a legal privilege.
Kirtley finally argues that step 4 could be satisfied with "a narrow rule of mediation privilege
which reduces the loss of evidence to the justice system while maintaining the benefits of confidentiality
for mediation where most appropriate." Id. This contention assumes that we can value confidentiality
in the mediation process and create a mechanism that balances that need with the need for information
available to a finder of fact. The problem is that there is no empirical evidence to support the assertion
that mediation needs confidentiality. Any mechanism seeking to balance the weights of the these
competing interests is merely guessing because it cannot know the actual weight of confidentiality.
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It is not intellectually honest to create a privilege simply because it seems
to provide a quick or simple solution to a confidentiality concern. A privilege
should be created when there is a demonstrated empirical need for the privilege and
when the privilege creates a benefit to society as a whole. In contrast, the UMA
Privilege Against Disclosure is not supported by analogous empirical evidence or a
utilitarian societal justification under the Wigmore analysis. As I will next discuss,
the proposed Privilege Against Disclosure should not be accorded privilege
protection because privilege has not been, and should not be, applied to a
relationship of adversarial interests.
III. PRIVILEGE IS NOT AN APPROPRIATE MECHANISM
FOR CREATING MEDIATION CONFIDENTIALITY
A. There is no HistoricalPrecedentfor Applying Privilege to a
Relationship ofAdversarialInterests
Privilege is the ability to not reveal information where persons in other
circumstances would have no protection from compelled revelation. As I will
discuss in this section, privilege has been used, and should be used, to protect
relationships of common interests where any third party presence is merely
incidental to the base relationship protected by the privilege. The UMA Privilege
Against Disclosure fundamentally contradicts this historic and appropriate use of
privilege. It would apply privilege to a relationship where information was revealed
to an adversarial interest, in the presence of a third party (the mediator), without
whom the underlying relationship (the mediation) could not exist.
In order to fully analyze the use and purpose of the Privilege Against
Disclosure we must first examine the historical development of other privileges.
While much has been surmised about the true origins of the concept of privilege and
the roots of specific privileges, the actual origins are largely unknown. Most
modem privileges are creations of statute.2" 6 The most commonly cited rationale for
privileges is that they "encourage vital interpersonal relationships which might be
seriously prejudiced by the prospect of breached confidentiality. '21 7
There are at least five privileges of wide spread adoption and lengthy
historical acceptance: the privilege against self-incrimination, the attorney-client
privilege, the husband-wife privilege, the priest-penitent privilege, and the physicianpatient privilege. 218 All of these, except the privilege against self-incrimination, are
based on the existence of some form of relationship. 2' 9 Rule 501's standard of

216. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 13.
217. Weinberg, supra n. 29, at 2.
218. There are other privileges, such as the informer, accountant-client, journalist-informant,
psychiatrist-patient, and psychologist-patient, which are not as widely acknowledged or lack the historical

acceptance of the privileges I will discuss.
219. 1will not be discussing the privilege, and constitutional right, against self-incrimination because
it has little value in analysis of the Privilege Against Disclosure. I will discuss privileges in which
information was revealed to another (relational privileges). The self-incrimination privilege is asserted
to prevent the compulsion of initial disclosure, not the disclosure of information already revealed.
I will also not discuss the forms of privilege created by Federal Rules of Evidence 407
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"reason and experience" directs courts to continue the "evolutionary development
of testimonial privileges."22 Undoubtedly some proponents of the Privilege Against
Disclosure will attempt to argue that the privilege is simply part of the evolution of
general privilege protection. That position is inaccurate. The protection of privilege
has never been extended to a relationship of adversarial interests, while the Privilege
Against Disclosure is based on a relationship where the parties have adversarial
interests. The Privilege Against Disclosure applies to subsequent adversarial
proceedings before a court, administrative agency, arbitration panel, adjudications
in juvenile court or criminal misdemeanor tribunals, or possibly felony criminal
proceedings.22' The UMA anticipates disputes going to mediation because the
parties have competing interests. It further anticipates that information will be
revealed during the mediation process that parties would not be revealing to each
other in the absence of that process.222
1. The Attorney-Client Privilege
Aside from the privilege against self-incrimination, the only privileges
recognized at common law were attorney-client and husband-wife.223 "The most
commonly asserted justification for the attorney-client privilege is that it encourages
free and full consultation by the parties to [the] relationship, unfettered by the client's
apprehension of compulsory disclosure.
The valid invocation of the privilege
generally rests upon five factors.225 First, the attorney must have been consulted in
a professional capacity.22 6 Second, the attorney must be a duly licensed practitioner
or at least believed to be so by the client.227 Third, the consultation between the

("Subsequent Remedial Measures"), 408 ("Compromise and Offers to Compromise"), and 409 ("Payment
of Medical or Similar Expenses"). These rules are not like traditional relational privileges or the Privilege
Against Disclosure. See Note, supra n. 202, at 1339. They focus on extrinsic activities. 1d. Instead of
acting to ensure confidentiality, they merely block the particular evidentiary uses of the material they
cover. Id.
220. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 2 (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47).
221. See U.M.A. Reporter's Notes for § 5 (noting that application of the Privilege Against Disclosure
to criminal felony proceedings is subject to a special weighing process due to differing policy interests
of the states).
222. See Ehrhardt, supran. 25, at 119 ("A mediation privilege differs in at least one significant aspect
to most other 'common law' privileges. In the latter, only the professional and the protected party have
knowledge of the contents of the privileged communication. In the case of the mediation privilege,
knowledge of the communications in the joint session is possessed by the opposing party").
223. There is an argument that a form of the priest-penitent privilege was also recognized at English
common law. See The English Reports vol. 175, 934 (1930) (citing W.M. Best, The Principles of the
Law of Evidence vol. 1, 596 (1876)). See also Harold W. Tiemann, The Right to Silence: Privileged
Communication andthePastor36 (John Knox Press 1964) (quoting The English Reports vol. 175 (1930)
("The sanctity of confession ... has been recognized [under English common law]").
The first American publication on privilege appears to be Zephaniah Swift, A Digest of the
Law ofEvidence (Hartford 1810 & photo reprint 1872). See Note, supran. 97, at 1457 ("Swift reiterated
the attomey-client and spousal privileges. Responding to a growing debate over the propriety of
recognizing other privileges, Swift noted, but dismissed as unsupported, physician's and clergyman's
claims to similar privileges"). Id. at 1457-8.
224. Weinberg, supra n. 29 at 8.
225. Id. 9-10.
226. Id. at 9
227. Id.
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parties must relate to legal advice or service.22

Fourth, the communication must

concern the matters upon which the service or advice is solicited.22 9 Worded
differently, the communication must be made as part of the purpose of the client in
soliciting advice on the matter in question. 230Fifth, there must have been either an
express or implied intent of confidentiality.
The prevailing view of the attorney-client privilege was set forth by
Wigmore. 23 ' According to Wigmore, the attorney-client privilege was recognized
in the late sixteenth century.232 The early rationale for the privilege was a respect for
the honor or status of being a lawyer, 233 and the privilege actually belonged to the
attorney, not the client. 3 4 It is almost impossible to find authors who dispute
Wigmore's position. However, a contrary view is espoused by Jonathan Auburn who
reviewed several cases from the Chancery Court in the late sixteenth century. 2" He
concluded that it is not possible to come to a definitive answer to the origin and
rationale for the attorney-client privilege.236 He maintains that the privilege was not
a blanket protection for lawyers.237 They could be called as witnesses, but would be
discharged from their duty to answer questions predicated on certain matters, 238 and
those matters were tightly restricted to ones arising out of the lawyer's involvement
in the case at hand.239
Looking at the perspectives of both authors, it appears accurate to say that
the rationale for the attorney-client privilege is in two parts. First, the privilege
arises out of a respect for the occupation of lawyers and their role in society.
Second, the privilege is based on the understanding that information is exchanged
between lawyers and clients which the lawyer needs in order to best represent the
client. Such information could be severely damaging to the client if revealed by the
lawyer without the client's permission and such information may not be revealed to
the lawyer if the client were afraid it would be subsequently disclosed by the lawyer.
This justification rests on the idea that the lawyer is working for the client and that
the lawyer represents the client's interests. 40 While the lawyer and the client may
have different personal values, preferences, or beliefs, the interests of the lawyer and

228. Id. The attorney-client privilege does not necessarily apply to all services provided by the

attorney. "Where an attorney renders services substantially equivalent to those of an accountant, it has
been held that no privilege may be asserted." Id. at 38.
229. Id. at 9-10.
230. Id. at 10.
231. See generally Wigmore, supran. 19.
232. Wigmore, supra n. 19, at § 2290. Wigmore identifies the case of Berd v. Lovelace (1577) as the
earliest recorded recognition of an attorney-client privilege in English law. Id.
233. Wigmore, supra n. 19, at § 2290.

234. Id.
235. Auburn, supra n. 124, at 5-6. See also Radin, supra n. 126 (arguing that the attorney-client
privilege stems from Roman law and that by the 4th century A.D. advocates and attorneys were made
incompetent as witnesses in the case in which they acted).

236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Aubum,supran. 124, at5.

239. Id.
240. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51 ("The lawyer-client privilege rests on the need for the advocate and
counselor to know all that relates to the client's reasons for seeking representation if the professional
mission is to be carried out").
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client are not adverse to each other in the attorney-client relationship. The lawyer
is the agent of the client, not her adversary.24 '
The UMA maintains that its Privilege Against Disclosure is "analogous to
the attorney-client privilege" because the attorney-client privilege "sometimes
applies in situations of differing interests among clients, notably in the context of
joint defense in which interests of the clients may conflict in part and yet one may
prevent later disclosure by another."' 242 The UMA drafters are searching for an
established privilege to compare their proposed protection to, but this argument is
fundamentally flawed and dangerously misleading to any who might rely on it.
There may be an attorney-client privilege between an attorney and multiple
clients in a single proceeding. That does not mean that there is client-client
confidentiality in that situation. 24' The purpose of the joint defense privilege is to
preserve the same public policy interests as traditional attorney-client privilege.2' "
While the attorney-client privilege might prevent a lawyer from revealing
information to non-parties, there is no protection when the parties to a lawsuit later
become adverse to each other. 245 Courts have been clear that neither an attorney 246
or a party 247 can utilize the attorney-client privilege when parties engage in
subsequent litigation against each other. This "subsequent litigation exception" is
based on the view that joint defenders, who later become adverse, cannot reasonably
be allowed to deny each other the use of information that they have by virtue of the
other's own disclosure. 2 4' This is exactly the type of situation that is likely to occur

241. Two authors argue that protection for attorney-client communications is at least partly based on
the attorney's role as a servant, obliged to keep his master's secrets. See Shuman & Weiner, supra n. 50,
at 49 ("Just as a slave could not testify against a master because the slave was part of the family, and,
therefore, a party to its mutual fidelity, so the attorney had a similar moral duty which the law
recognized").
242. U.M.A. Reporter's Notes for § 5(3)(b).
243. See Paul R. Perito et al., Joint Defense Agreements: Protecting the Privilege, Protecting the
Future, 4 Crim. Just. 6, 7 (1990) ("The joint defense privilege does not protect conversations between
defendants outside the presence of counsel ....
").See also Matter of Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum Dated November 16, 1974,406 F. Supp. 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); ContinentalOil Co. v. US., 330
F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1964).
244. Perito et al., supran. 243, at 8. See Patricia Welles, A Survey of Attorney-Client Privilege in
Joint Defense, 35 U. Miami L. Rev. 321, 324-25 (1981) (identifying Chahoon v. The Commonwealth,
62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822 (1871) as the first United States case recognizing the attorney-client privilege in
joint defense and asserting that a primary justification for the Privilege is "an increasingly common fact
about litigation today: codefendants need to pool their resources to present the best defense").
245. Perito et al., supra n. 243, at 9 (citing In re LTVSec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Tex. 1981))
("Because shared information was not intended to be confidential between defendants, courts have held
that communications may be introduced into evidence in subsequent litigation in which former defendants
squarely face each other" Courts have also held that "communications may be protected by the joint
defense privilege even though defendants may have potential cross-claims against each other"). Seealso
Welles,supra n. 244, at 331-37 ("[]fformer clients disagree among themselves and subsequently become
opposing parties in a lawsuit the privilege is inapplicable").
246. See e.g. Quintel Corp., N V. v. Citibank N.A., 567 F. Supp. 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that
"an attorney who represents two parties with respect to a single matter may not assert the [attorney-client]
privilege in a later dispute between those clients").
247. See e.g. Central Nat. Ins. Co. of Omaha v. Med. Protective Co. of Fort Wayne, Indiana, 107
F.R.D. 393 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (holding that "when a lawyer represents two clients in a matter of common
interest
. . . . the [attorney-client] privilege cannot be claimed by one client with respect to
communications between that client and the attorney in a subsequent action between the two clients").
248. See Ohio Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Kaplan, 90 F.R.D. 21,32 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
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in mediation. One party reveals information to the other during the mediation
process. The dispute is not resolved in that mediation. The parties go to court and
the first party desires to offer information revealed by the second during mediation.
Their interests are adverse. This is the "subsequent litigation exception" in a
different context. There is no analogous attorney-client privilege protection for the
mediation process.
The attorney-client privilege, by its very title, is premised on a one-on-one
relationship. Generally, the presence of a third party during the attorney-client
discussion negates the privilege and renders the client and attorney unable to assert
it for protection of communications.2 49 There is an exception. When other
individuals are present and necessary to the process, such as secretaries,
stenographers, or clerks, the privilege is not obviated. 250 The UMA compares its
proposed privilege to the attorney-client privilege. However, the two are really
nothing alike. The UMA privilege covers a relationship of adverse parties with
competing interests. The attorney-client privilege applies to the relationship of a
client, and an attorney representing her interests.
2. The Husband-Wife Privilege
Like the attorney-client privilege, the husband-wife privilege addresses a
common goal, as opposed to adverse interests. The purpose of the privilege is to
"encourage mutual confidences between husband and wife to preserve the marital
251
status."
The privilege was created for the protection of the institution ofmarriage.252
When the interests of the husband and wife become sufficiently adverse the privilege
may not be recognized. 2" In Trammel, the Supreme Court held that the traditional
operation of the spousal privilege had been changed.254 In the past, one spouse could
invoke the privilege to prevent the other from testifying against them in a criminal
proceeding. The privilege had been used to exclude all adverse spousal testimony,
regardless of the desire of the otherwise testifying spouse. The Court cited Jeremy
Bentham for the rationale that "such a privilege goes far beyond making 'every
man's house his castle,' and permits a person to convert his house to a 'den of

249. Weinberg, supra n. 29, at 10.
250. Id.
251. Tiemann, supra n. 223, at 78.
252.
Id. A less socially acceptable basis also underlies this historical view of a single interest. In 1628, Lord
Coke held that "it hath beene resolved by the Justices that a wife cannot be produced either against or
for her husband." Trammel, 445 U.S. at 43-44 (quoting I Edward Coke, A Commentarie Upon Littleton
6b (1628)). The principle behind this decision was that a husband and wife were one and, since the wife
had no recognized legal existence apart from her husband, the husband was the one that legally mattered.

Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44.
253. See In re Witness, 791 F.2d at 239; Fulk, 816 F.2d 1204.

254. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47.
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thieves." 255 The Court was clear that when interests are adverse, the husband-wife
privilege is not applicable.256
As with the attorney-client privilege, the general rule is clear that when a
third party is present and overhears the intra-spousal communication there is no
privilege protection." 7 Either party may testify or be compelled to testify, even after
It is readily foreseeable that third parties may be
the death of the third party.
exposed to communications between husband and wife, the most likely third parties
are children of the spouses. The presence of children may create an exception to the
waiver of privilege, but the level of security created by this exception is highly
suspect. If the spousal communication occurs in the presence of young children who
pay no attention to what is said, the privilege survives.259 The privilege does not
survive if the children are older. 26
3. The Priest-Penitent Privilege
Perhaps the most written about privilege is the one generally referred to as
ta there has been so much written about this privilege
priest-penitent. 261 I suspect that
because of the many religious institutions it applies to. Stated generally, the priestpenitent privilege recognizes the "human need to disclose to a spiritual counselor,
in total and absolute confidence, what are believed to be flawed acts or thoughts and
to receive priestly consolation and guidance in return., 262 The privilege did not exist
at common law and comes from a variety of sources and beliefs.
For the Roman Catholic Church, confession is one of the seven sacraments.
Confession is required at least once each year. The confession is given to the priest
"under seal," or under the mandate that information divulged to the priest is not to
be disclosed absent express consent by the penitent. 63 For the Roman Catholic
priest, "no matter what a court of law may require, no matter what personal
inconvenience or incarceration may result, unless he has the permission of the

255. Id. at 51-52. The Court held that a spouse could elect to assert the privilege on his own behalf,
but could not invoke the privilege to block the testimony of the other spouse who wished to testify. Much
of the rationale focused on changes in societal perceptions which now recognize a woman as more than
mere chattel. Id. at 52-53.
256. Id. at 52.
257. See Tiemann, supra n. 223, at 78.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Many of these works have been authored, or co-authored, by clergy or those otherwise affiliated
with religious institutions. See id. See also Richard M. Gula, Ethics in PastoralMinistry (Paulist Press
1996). 1 suspect they have analyzed this privilege because, even though they may have been well
educated in their particular religious disciplines and are likely to have been confronted with practical
privilege issues in their daily activities, they were still uncertain of the ethical and legal limits of
confidentiality protections.
262. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51.
263. See Edward A. Hogan, Jr., A Modern Problem on the Privilegeof the Confessional,Loy. L. Rev.
1,3-4 (1951) (citing Canon 889, section 1) ("The sacramental seal is inviolable, and hence the confessor
") (Canon
shall be most careful not to betray the penitent by any word or sign or in any other way ....
2369 identified the primary importance of this privilege, "[a confessor ]...who dares to break the seal
of confession directly, remains under excommunication reserved modo specialissimo to the Apostolic
See"). Id. at 4.
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penitent, he cannot reveal the contents of the confession. '2 6 To do so would break
divine, natural, and ecclesiastic law and would subject him to permanent
excommunication from the church.265 Catholic recognition of the secrecy of
confessional dates back to at least 440 A.D.266
The Protestant minister has had a much more convoluted dilemma. "Except
for those who consider themselves Anglo-Catholic Episcopalians, confession.., to
a pastor is not a sacrament. ''267 Protestantism has not defined any clear-cut pastoral
counseling relationship, so the minister has no Canon or church doctrine to assert as
law preventing disclosure.268 It is easy to see that this type of dilemma could exist
in many religions.
The current basis of the federally recognized priest-penitent privilege
probably comes from two beliefs best summarized by the Lutheran church. First,
while that church laced the protection of the Catholic seal, maintaining secrecy of
confession was paramount in and of itself.269 Second, a confession occurred between
any Christian brothers, not just a parishioner and a priest.270 These two guidelines
appear to have set the stage for modem priest-penitent protections. The questions
now are not whether a particular religion has a specific law creating a privilege or
whether the person receiving confession has a certain title,2 71 the questions are
whether religious confession or disclosure took place and whether the confessor
reasonably relied upon confidentiality. If so, communications will be protected
under this broad privilege.272
Again, there are no adversarial interests under the priest-penitent privilege.
The penitent is confessing and seeking advice, comfort, and guidance.273 Existence
of adverse interests during confession generally destroys the applicability of the
priest-penitent privilege. As an example, the privilege has been held not to apply to

264. Tiemann, supra n. 223, at 20.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 31.
The first statute addressing priest-penitent confidentiality, termed the Articuli Clerci, was
enacted by the English Parliament in 1315. See Tiemann, supra n. 223, at 40. This statute became the
basis of the later privilege of confession allowing clergy to maintain the confidence of any confession
other than treason. See W.M. Best, The Principles of the Law ofEvidence vol. I1,
§§ 356-60 (Weare C.
Little & Co. 1876).
267. Tiemann, supra n. 223, at 21.
268. Id. at 22.
269. Id. at 50.
270. Id.
271. The question of whether the individual receiving the communication qualifies as clergy has
seldom been an issue in cases involving privilege. See Stone & Liebman, supra n. 183, at 364 (finding
that apart from Smith's Case, 2 NY City Hall reporter 77 (1817), the privilege has not been limited to
specific sects). Id.
272. See e.g. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d at 377 ("[W]e hold that a clergy-communicant
privilege does exist. We further hold that this privilege protects communications to a member of the
clergy, in his or her spiritual or professional capacity, by persons who seek spiritual counseling and who
reasonably expect that their words will be kept in confidence").
273. See Minutes of the Church Council of the American Lutheran Church 16 (Minneapolis: The
American Lutheran Church, 1960).
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a confession made to a prison chaplain in the presence of a custodial officer.27 4 The
situation that may be most similar to mediation is communication between clergy
and a husband and wife in church marital counseling. In that situation there are three
parties, as in mediation, but there are no competing interests. So long as there is a
single objective, the preservation of the marital institution, 75 the privilege should
apply.
4. The Physician-Patient Privilege
At common law there was no physician-patient privilege.276 The most
commonly asserted basis for the privilege is that it is necessary:
to evoke and encourage the utmost confidence between
the patient and his physician and to preserve it inviolate,
so that the patient will freely and frankly reveal to his
physician all of the facts, circumstances, and symptoms
of his malady or injury, or lay bare his body for
examination, and thus enable his physician to make a
correct diagnosis of his condition and treat him safely
and effectively.277
This privilege may present the strongest argument for protection, the risk of death
in the absence of full disclosure. 7 1 "Unless patients are assured that physicians
cannot be compelled to disclose confidences, patients will not seek medical care or
will not reveal
to their physicians all the information necessary for effective
279
treatment.,

274. See U.S. v. Webb, 615 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1980). The interests are adverse because the confessor
is admitting a crime and the officer is charged with enforcing laws. But see People v. Brown, 368
N.Y.S.2d 645 (1974) (refusing to allow an officer who overheard a defendant's telephone conversation
with a minister to testify as to the context of that conversation). See also State v. Deases, 518 N.W.2d
784 (Iowa 1994) (holding that a defendant's statements to a prison doctor were privileged despite the
presence of guards who heard them, as the guards were essential for providing medical care to the
inmate).
275. See Tiemann, supra n. 223, at 122 ("Couples contemplating divorce or experiencing serious
marital difficulties must be able to speak freely to the minister and to each other, in the presence of the
minister, about whatever is contributing to the breakup of the marriage").
276. Weinberg, supra n. 29, at 20.
277. Shuman & Weiner,supra n. 50, at 47 (quoting C. De Witt,. PrivilegedCommunicationsBetween
Physician and Patient 27 (Thomas 1958).
278. See Wigmore, supra n. 19, at § 2380a (quoting Commissioners on Revision of the Statutes of New
York, 3 N.Y. Rev. Stat. 737 (1836)) ("The ground on which communications to counsel are privileged,
is the supposed necessity ofa full knowledge of the facts, to advise correctly, and to prepare for the proper
defence or prosecution of a suit. But surely the necessity of consulting a medical adviser, when life itself
may be in jeopardy, is still stronger").
279. Shuman & Weiner, supran. 50, at 47. But see id. at 47-8 ("This argument assumes not only that
the patient is aware of the applicable law ofprivilege and considers it before consulting with a physician,
but also that the patient would avoid treatment or withhold information necessary for effective treatment
in the absence of a privilege. Few contend seriously that these assumptions accurately reflect patient
decision-making behavior in the case of physical problems").
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As with all the preceding privileges, there are no competing or adverse
interests in the physician-patient relationship. The patient wishes to get healthy and
the physician is the agent to effectuate that wish. As with the other privileges
discussed, the protection generally does not apply if third parties are present during
disclosure,"' although the protection survives if the persons present are family of the
party needing treatment or necessary for that medical treatment.28 '
The UMA seeks to create the Privilege Against Disclosure. That privilege
would apply to a relationship of competing interests and it would apply privilege
when at least one third party (the mediator) always exists.2" 2 Applying privilege to
such a relationship is fundamentally contrary to any historical privilege protection.
As with the previously discussed "everybody knows it's important" standard, the
Privilege Against Disclosure would be created because some person, group, or
interest wants it, and not because there is a historical basis for such application. I
understand that a mediation privilege is important to the drafters of the UMA. I
understand that there are those in the mediation community who feel a mediation
privilege is important to the field as a whole. I also understand that the UMA
privilege cannot be analyzed in a vacuum. The rules that will be applied to the
recognition of this privilege are likely to be applied to the recognition of other
privileges. Privilege protections are important or powerful only if they are respected.
That respect comes from the fact that they are unique; they are privileges, they are
not common.
The Privilege Against Disclosure would change all of the rules that have
been applied at common law, and should be applied by legislatures, to the analysis
and creation of a privilege: there would be no requirement of empirical justification,
no satisfaction of the Wigmore or other utilitarian analysis, and no conformity with
historical precedent. The immediate result of enactment of the UMA privilege
would be to allow the creation of privileges based on subjective standards or
analysis. The end result would be that privileges would become common and they
would lose the very feature that gave them power and protection to begin with.

280. See e.g. Tiemann, supran. 223, at 79. See also State v. LaRoche, 442 A.2d 602 (N.H. App. 1982)
(holding that an emergency medical technician who was in the emergency room, but not working under
the supervision of the attending physician, may testify as to what the defendant disclosed to the
physician).
281. See e.g. Deases, 518 N.W.2d 784 (holding that the physician-patient privilege can apply to
communications made in the presence of third parties if those parties are necessary for treatment).
282. The Privilege Against Disclosure would go even farther than merely applying when a third party
(the mediator) is present during communications. The privilege may actually be asserted by that third
party. See U.M.A. § 5 ("(2) A mediator may refuse to disclose a mediation communication, and may
prevent any other person from disclosing, a mediation communication of the mediator"). The privilege
could even be asserted by a non-party. Section 5(3) also states that "a nonparty participant may refuse
to disclose, and may prevent any other person from disclosing, a mediation communication of the
nonparty participant"). Id.
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B. The PrivilegeAgainst DisclosureShould not be Adopted
Because the PrivilegeMay Decrease the Likelihood of Knowing and
Informed Resolution of Disputes
There is a broad policy concern preventing privilege from being applied to
relationships of adversarial interests. In the previously discussed privileges,
information revealed or not revealed by the holder of the privilege2. 3 may cause
injury to that holder,2" 4 but that injury is largely self-inflicted. By contrast, the
Privilege Against Disclosure allows one party to damage the other through the
disclosure of information, while simultaneously being protected by the privilege.
A party to a mediation may reveal information to the other side that causes
damage to the receiving party. This injury is most likely to happen when one side
lies to or misleads the other and the party receiving the information believes the
misrepresentation or does not have the resources to examine the veracity of the
statement. In this context, the Privilege Against Disclosure may actually encourage
parties to lie during mediation. Their false statements cannot be used against them,
for any purpose, at trial or in a similar forum because the privilege would prevent
mediation communications from being introduced at subsequent adversarial
proceedings.
At least one author, Professor Lynn Rambo, has discussed the type and
211
accuracy of information disclosed by parties in general settlement discussions.
These general settlement discussions are analogous to information exchanged by
parties in a mediation where the goal is resolution of the dispute. Rambo specifically
addressed the contentions that cases most often settle when parties admit to
weaknesses in their cases and that a party will feel free to admit such weaknesses
when confidentiality exists. 8 6 She found both contentions to be unrealistic. 87 She
found that confidentiality may encourage disclosure of information relevant to
resolving a dispute, but not necessarily related to the true underlying facts.288 She
contended that using confidentiality to preclude impeachment protects only
dishonest parties. 9
The likelihood of a party disclosing false or misleading information may
be increased by the existence of privilege protection and the adversarial interests of
the parties. It may also be fostered by the less than common interests between the
mediator and a party. Unlike traditional privileges where a degree of necessity or

283. For purposes of article a "holder of the privilege" means the person in a privileged relationship
providing information to the service provider in that relationship, i.e. the client in an attorney-client
privilege relationship, the penitent in a priest-penitent privilege relationship, or the patient in a physicianpatient privilege relationship. The service provider may hold privilege protection as well.
284. lam certainly not contending that all holders of a privilege fully disclose all relevant information
to their service provider, or that the information they do disclose is true. However, I do believe that the
more true and complete the information given to the service provider is, the more likely it will be that the
service provider is better able to perform the services at issue, and the more likely it will be that the
holder of the privilege benefits from the result.
285. See generally Rambo, supra n. 9.
286. Id. at 1069.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 1079.
289. Id. at 1081
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loyalty is likely to exist between a service provider and a customer, parties to
mediation may not feel any necessity to disclose information to the mediator and
they may not feel any loyalty to her either.2 90 Parties to a mandatory mediation may
have no intention of resolving a dispute at mediation or participating in the process
in any meaningful manner. As opposed to traditional privilege relationships where
the holder is more likely to benefit from sharing true information with the service
provider, a party to a mediation may be more likely to benefit from providing a
mediator with false or misleading information. Such information may mislead or
confuse adversarial parties and mislead or misdirect the mediator. The Privilege
Against Disclosure allows parties in mediation to use privilege protection to injure
other parties. It is for this reason that privilege has not been, and should not be,
applied to relationships of adversarial interests.
IV. CREATING MEDIATION CONFIDENTIALITY
THROUGH CONTRACT PROVISIONS
I do not maintain that mediation can never benefit from confidentiality, I
maintain that any benefits are situationally specific. Confidentiality may be a
priority to some parties in some mediations. The perception of confidentiality may
encourage those parties to disclose information they would otherwise conceal.2 9'

290. Note, supra n. 202, at 1357 ("The relationship between mediator and party differs in important
ways from the relationships protected by traditional relational privileges. First, the relationship is likely
to be a one time affair, lasting only as long as a single dispute continues. Second, the traditional relational
privileges all promote some notion of loyalty between the litigating party and the privileged
communicator. Because a mediator must have the same relationship with both parties, she cannot have
the same type of loyalty interest at stake. Finally, the relationships protected by relational privilege rules
are voluntary and can be dissolved more or less freely. In contrast, mediation - and thus the relationship
between mediator and party-is compulsory in some contexts").
291. My position is predicated on parties operating under an express choice of confidentiality or no
confidentiality. Given only those choices, I believe they would be more likely to disclose, and to disclose
more fully, when confidentiality existed. I do not believe that disclosures would be increased, or the
extent of disclosures would be increased, if parties were fully aware of the limitations to confidentiality
protections. See supra nn. 148-158.
1 also do not believe that disclosures would generally be decreased in a situation where
confidentiality was not addressed. Research demonstrates that when confidentiality is made an issue, the
existence ofconfidentiality becomes important and may influence disclosure and the extent ofdisclosure.
When confidentiality is not made an issue, disclosures are not effected by the existence or non-existence
of confidentiality. See supra nn. 104-113 (finding no statistically significant difference in disclosures
between groups where confidentiality was not discussed and where confidentiality was mentioned
generally (i.e. confidence was not made an issue), but finding a dramatic change when people were told
specifically that there was no confidentiality (i.e. confidence was made an issue)).
The question that logically follows is "Doesn't everybody want confidentiality in mediation?
(In other words, "Isn't confidentiality always an issue?") The answer is no. Lay persons do not appear
to be greatly concerned with confidentiality. See Note, supra n. 119, at 1232. Confidentiality is likely
to become important in mediation when lawyers are involved. See J. Brad Reich, Med-Rec: the Next
LogicalStep in the Evolution ofLawyer Driven Mediation (2001) (unpublished manuscript on file with
the author) (discussing the increasing importance and control of lawyers in "lawyer driven mediation" and
identifying that the interests and priorities of the lawyers largely control the structure of the mediation
process). At least one study has shown that lawyers are a primary source of information for users and
prospective users of mediation and other alternative dispute resolution devices. See John Lande, Getting
the Faith: Why Business Lawyers and Executives Believe in Mediation, 5 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 137, 170
(2000). If confidentiality is important to lawyers, and lawyers influence client demands or concerns of
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The parties to a mediation are in the best position to know what they want and need
from that mediation process. 92 If the parties want confidentiality in a specific
situation, they can attempt to create it through contractual provisions.
Confidentiality is a situationally specific issue. It is not a general public concern
mandating the creation of a statutory privilege. 93
In this section, I will argue there is no mechanism that truly guarantees
confidentiality within mediation, 94 but that well drafted contract provisions allow
the parties to exercise self-determination and to delineate and control, to the best of
their abilities, how information revealed during the mediation process should be
treated. Contract provisions allow the parties the best opportunity to clearly state
whether they want confidentiality, how extensive they both want and can expect that
confidentiality to be, and how that confidentiality protection should be enforced.
Contract provisions should be drafted prior to commencing mediation 95 and should
be intended to control the present and future treatment of information revealed
during mediation.
A. ContractProvisionsMay Make Parties to Mediation Aware of
Limitations on Confidentiality and Allow Them to Make Better Informed
Decisions Regardingthe Disclosure ofInformation DuringMediation
The use of contract provisions may allow parties to better understand what
they want and can reasonably expect confidentiality to be in a particular mediation.
This increased understanding of the scope and limitations of confidentiality
protection may allow parties to make better informed decisions regarding the
disclosure of information during the mediation process.
Jurisdictions have attempted to define confidentiality protection through
mechanisms including common law, statutory protections such as privileges or

mediation, confidentiality may be made into an important issue for clients and a lack of confidentiality
may inhibit disclosure. This does not mean that confidentiality would have been important to clients, or
thata lack ofconfidentiality would have caused a decrease in client disclosures, absent lawyers' influence.
292. Unsophisticated or inexperienced parties may need to consult an attomey or other sources to be
fully aware of these wants and needs.
293. SeeGreen, supran. 10, at 32 ("[M]ediation has flourished without recognition of aprivilege, most
likely on assurance given by the parties and the mediator that they agree to keep mediation matters
confidential.".... "Thus, [assuming] the need for confidentiality in most cases is recognized, the need
for a blanket privilege is not essential").
294. The various mechanisms used for creating confidentiality in voluntary mediation all have
deficiencies, uncertainties, or limitations. But see Galton & Kovach, supra n. 202, at 967 (discussing
statutory protections which may be argued to create absolute confidentiality in the separate context of
court ordered mediation).
295. There may be an argument that parties may not know what form and extent of confidentiality
protection they want until after mediation has begun, but a protection identified after disclosure is not a
protection against past disclosure. Allowing parties to proceed through mediation without an agreement
identifying the extent of confidentiality can create a situation where the issue of confidentiality quickly
becomes moot, a party or parties may have already disclosed information gained during the mediation
process.
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categorical evidentiary exclusions, and interpretations of existing evidentiary rules.296
None of these create a true guarantee of confidentiality.297 While parties to
mediation may not know it,29 each of these mechanisms is subject to court
interpretation or enforceability,29 9 balancing of competing needs or interests,3" and
categorical exclusions from protection. 0'
Three of the more prominent sources of confidentiality were analyzed in the
February, 2001, draft of the UMA. °2 The "categorical evidence approach"30 3 was
dismissed as "too uncertain 30 4 because the drafters of the UMA 30 believed that
courts are hesitant to enforce provisions that eliminate an entire category of
evidence.306 The "testamentary incapacity approach, 30 7 was discussed and dismissed
as "too constrained 30 8 because it would not have prevented compelled disclosures
by the parties, only by the mediator.3 0 9 Finally, the "settlement discussion

296. State legislatures have enacted more than 250 mediation confidentiality statutes. See U.M.A.
Reporter's Notes for § 2(1). Twenty-five have enacted confidentiality protections that apply generally
to mediations in the state, while the other half include confidentiality protection within the provisions of
specific substantive statutes, but lack general protections. Id. See generally Daniel R. Conrad,
ConfidentialityProtection in Mediation: Methods and PotentialProblems in North Dakota, 74 N.D. L.
Rev. 45 (1998); Macturk, supran. 204. See also Ohio Cuyahoga Cty. Ct. R. 21.2, that appears to attempt
to simultaneously create statutory categorical evidence protection, evidentiary exclusion, and
testamentary incapacity. Ohio Cuyahoga Cty. Ct. R. 21.2 (1996).
297. See Leonard L. Riskin & James E. Westbrook, DisputeResolution andLawyers 221 (West Publg.
Co. 1987) ("Confidentiality, although usually considered tobe both an important aspect, and a functional
necessity of mediation, is not universally guaranteed." "Traditional rules of evidence, court-created
privileges, or contracts between the parties do not provide protection that is sufficiently great or clear to
encourage the kinds of disclosures necessary to the fullest use of mediation"). Id. at 248.
298. It is unclear how frequently, or to what extent, mediators explain confidentiality and limitations
on confidentiality to parties. Ifmediator explanations are similar to some lawyer explanations, itis highly
unlikely that parties will be aware of limitations on confidentiality protection. See text accompanying
nn. 132, 141-143. It is also highly unlikely that parties would be independently aware of the scope of
mediation privilege protection. See Miller, supra n. 24.
299. See e.g. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 644.101 (West Supp. 1986).
300. See generally Macaluso, 618 F.2d at 54-55 (balancing the search for the truth and the
congressional intent in creating the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service). See also Jaffee, 518
U.S. at 9-13, 17-18; Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708-13; In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1075-79.
301. See generally Macturk, supra n. 204.
302. See Uniform Mediation Act with Prefatory Notes and Reporter's Notes* for § 5(5)(a)-(c) (prop.
off. draft Feb. 2001).
*The February, 2001, Draft Uniform Mediation Act is a thirty-eight page document
downloaded from www.pon.harvard.edu/guests/ uma/NovUMAWP.htm. Approximately eight pages of
the document are the provisions for the proposed Act. The remainder is composed of Prefatory Notes
and Reporter's Notes.
303. The "categorical evidence approach" refers to creating a general evidentiary exclusion for a
particular category of evidence. In the context of mediation, communications elicited during the
mediation process would be entirely excluded from use as evidence at trial.
304. Id. See U.M.A. Reporter's Notes for § 5(5)(b) (Feb. draft).
305. Id.
306. This rationale is perplexing because the Privilege Against Disclosure could deprive a variety of
tribunals, including courts, of an entire category of evidence as well.
307. The "testamentary incapacity approach" generally refers to making amediator legally incompetent
to testify as to communications made during mediation.
308. See U.M.A. Reporter's Notes for § 5(5)(c) (Feb. draft).
309. Id.
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approach" 3 was dismissed as "too limited"3 ' because it would not apply to certain

310. The "settlement discussion approach" is based on Federal Rule of Evidence 408. See Fed. R.
Evid. 408 (2000).
Rule 408 - Compromise and Offers to Compromise
Evidence of(1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2)
accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in
compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to
either validity oramount, is not admissible to prove liability foror invalidity of the
claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise
negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion
of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the
course of compromise negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion
when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice
of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to
obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
Id.
The "settlement discussion approach" is particularly interesting when compared with the UMA
search for mediation confidentiality protection. The settlement discussion approach uses Rule 408, or
similar statutes, to create confidentiality in mediations. It has been argued that Rule 408 creates a general
protection for communications made in mediation. See Ehrhardt, supra n. 25, at 96-97. But only a few
states have applied their equivalent of Rule 408 to mediation specifically. See Macturk, supran. 204, at
419.
Rule 408 is most interesting because of its purpose and inherent, but accepted, limitations.
The purpose of Rule 408 is to promote negotiations that lead to settlement prior to trial. See Ehrhardt,
supra n. 25, at 102. Where the equivalent of Rule 408 has been applied, its protection has been subject
to at least three key exclusions. First, by its own language, Rule 408 does not protect evidence used for
another purpose, such as impeachment or the establishment of bias. Second, Rule 408 protects only items
in dispute and does not create confidentiality for items not in dispute. Id. See Jane Michaels, Rule 408:
A LitigationMinefield, 19 Litig. 34,35-36 (1992). Third, Rule 408 protects only information exchanged,
it does not protect people transmitting or receiving that information. As an example, a person cannot use
Rule 408 to quash a subpoena, although the Rule may limit the subjects which the person may be
compelled to discuss. See Conrad, supra n. 296, at 48.
Without doubt, Rule 408 is a veritable minefield for those relying on its protection to keep
settlement negotiations confidential, but there is no clarion cry to create an absolute Privilege Against
Disclosure under Rule 408. Perhaps that is because while the courts and society recognize an interest in
promoting the settlement of disputes, that interest is not sufficient to keep otherwise relevant evidence
from the trier of fact under a wide variety of circumstances. However the UMA would create aprivilege
to prevent the type of exceptions found under Rule 408. See U.M.A. § 5(l)-(3) (Feb. draft).
The goals of mediation are unclear and subjective. See supra text accompanying n.n. 207-212.
If we were to adopt the view of some authors and some lawyers that the purpose of mediation is
settlement then we would be left with trying to justify a greater privilege for mediation, simply because
it is mediation, than Rule 408 provides for the same goal and public policy in its protection of settlement
discussions. See Bobbi McAdoo, A Report to the Minnesota Supreme Court: The Impact of Rule 114
on Civil LitigationPracticesin Minnesota 31 (Minn. Sup. Ct. Off. of CLE 1997) (Minnesota lawyer
responses identified that the top two factors motivating them to voluntarily choose mediation were to
"save litigation expenses" and because "settlement [was] more likely"). See also Bobbi McAdoo & Art
Hinshaw, Missouri Data 13 (2000) (unpublished data summary on file with author) (Missouri lawyer
responses identified that theirtop reason forvoluntarily choosing mediation was that mediation "speed[s]
settlement").
311. See U.M.A. Reporter's Notes for § 5(5)(a) (Feb. Draft).
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proceedings and it would have several well recognized exceptions.3" 2 According to
the UMA each of these mechanisms was unable to create confidentiality for
mediation communications, so it proposes the Privilege Against Disclosure. The
problem is that the UMA privilege cannot guarantee mediation confidentiality
either..a and parties to mediation would not likely be aware of limitations on the
privilege's scope of protection.""
It is clear that when a mediation privilege has been legislated or otherwise
recognized, it has not been absolute. Exceptions to confidentiality have been both
expressly created and decided on a case by case basis. Mediation statutes include
exceptions for "otherwise discoverable material,"3t the "independent investigation
exception,"3' 1 6 and "disclosure required by statute."3 7 There are also exceptions
covering the need to enforce mediated agreements,"' exceptions relating to the
overriding need for access to the information,3" 9 exceptions for subsequent litigation
"
between the parties,32° exceptions dealing with professional misconduct,32
'
322
exceptions necessary for the conduct of the mediation session,
exceptions
regarding the commission of a future crime,323 and exceptions to prevent manifest
injustice.324 Courts have created common law exceptions for cross examination in
ajuvenile proceeding, 25 the necessity for ruling upon a motion for sanctions arising

312. UMA drafters felt the Settlement Discussion Approach would not apply to fora where the rules
of evidence did not apply such as in discovery proceedings, administrative hearings, arbitration hearings,
and certain pre and post trial proceedings, Id.
313. The UMA clearly anticipates limitations on the Privilege Against Disclosure. First, the proposed
Privilege would apply to compulsory revelation of mediation communications in subsequent adversarial
proceedings. See text accompanying n. 221. It would not provide confidentiality protection for voluntary
disclosures in a non-adversarial context (i.e. the Privilege Against Disclosure would not prevent a party
from revealing mediation communications at a press conference.) Second, the UMA specifically
provides for limitations on its privilege protection through the use of a balancing test by the courts. See
supra n. 147.
314. See supratext accompanying n. 298. In analogous studies very few attorneys informed clients
as to limitations on confidentiality protection. See id. It is easy to surmise that mediators may behave
similarly, especially if you give weight to the position that lawyers have an economic incentive to allow
clients to believe that confidentiality is greater than it actually is. See supra text accompanying n. 154.
A substantial number of mediators are also lawyers. Lawyer-mediators may bring the same economic
priorities to the mediation process. See Note, supra n. 202, at 1356 ("what is truly at stake with a
mediator's privilege is the promotion of the process of mediation rather than the protection of the
relationship between mediator and party").
315. See e.g. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.183 (West Supp. 1997). See also Wash. Rev. Code § 5.60.070(1 )(b)
(Supp.1994).
316. See e.g. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 494.02 (West 1990).
317. See e.g. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2238 (West 1994). See also Colo.Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-22-307
(West Supp. 1996).
318. See e.g. Iowa Code Ann. § 679C.2 (West 2000). See also Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4612 (1999).
319. See e.g. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-1-115 (West Supp. 1996).
320. See e.g. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2238(B)(2) (West 1994); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 5-512 (1996); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 2317.023 (Anderson 1996); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1805(0 (West 1993); Tenn. Code
Ann. § 36-4-130(b)(2)(1996); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.22(ii) (Mite 1992).
321. See e.g. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 595.02 (West Supp. 1997).
322. See e.g. Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 23-601 - 23-606 (1995).
323. See e.g. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-22-307(2)(b)(Supp. 1993).
324. See e.g. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2317.023(c)(4); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 904.085(e) (West 1996).
325. See Rinaker v. SuperiorCourt, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464 (1998).
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out of court ordered mediation,326 and for the determination of the enforceability of
agreement reached at mediation.327
As both statutes and common law demonstrate, there is no mediation
privilege protection that is absolute. It is uncertain to what extent the Privilege
Against Disclosure would actually create or protect mediation confidentiality. There
is no reason to believe that the privilege, even if uniformly adopted, would be
uniformly interpreted or applied and "[a]n uncertain privilege, or one which purports
to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better
than no privilege at all. 3 21 On the other hand, a well drafted contract provision
329
It
should recognize, on its face, that it does not create absolute confidentiality.
may even identify specific statutory exceptions to confidentiality in a particular
jurisdiction.330 The ability to make an informed decision regarding disclosure, at
least to the extent of understanding there is no absolute confidentiality for mediation
communications, may be very important to the parties. Parties can then choose to
participate in mediation and disclose information as they see fit.

B. The Level of ConfidentialityNeeded and Wanted in Mediation
Varies and is Properly Defined by the Partiesto a ParticularDispute
A multitude of commentators have posited that mediation needs
confidentiality. 3 ' These authors seem to go forward as if there is some universal
understanding of what confidentiality should be in mediation. Nobody seems to
have asked the critical underlying question: "What do the parties in this particular
mediation need confidentiality to be?"

326. See Foxgate Homeowners'Assn. v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916 (Cal. App. 2000),
superseded by, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 441 (Cal. 2000) (holding that portions of a mediator's report about
sanctionable conduct allegedly occurring during the mediation process, and evidence of statements made
during that mediation, could be considered when ruling on a motion for sanctions).
On July 9, 2001, the Supreme Court of California over-tumed the lower court's decision in
Foxgateand held unanimously that there are no exceptions to the statutory confidentiality of mediation
communications or to the statutory limits on the content of a mediator's reports. See Foxgate
Homeowners'Assn., Inc., v. Bramalea Cal., Inc.. 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 642 (Cal. 2001).
327. See Clam v. Congress Mortg. Co., et al., 68 F. Supp. 2d I110 (N.D. Cal. 1999), distinguished
by,Foxgate 11,108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 642.
328. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393.
329. At a minimum a well drafted confidentiality contact provision should include language to the
effect that "Information disclosed by the parties or the mediator during the mediation process may be
revealed pursuant to court order or as otherwise required by law."
330. It should be the mediator's responsibility to identify these exceptions to parties who may not have
sufficient expertise to be aware of statutory limitations on mediation confidentiality protection. If the
parties are represented by counsel, that counsel may help identify these exceptions as well.
331. See generally Freedman & Prigoff, supra n. 29; Riskin & Westbrook, supra n. 296, at 221
("Confidentiality (is) usually considered to be both an important aspect of, and in fact a functional
necessity of,mediation"); Galton & Kovach,supra n. 202, at 952 ("Confidentiality is generally considered
a fundamental hallmark of ADR and often, assumed to be essential to the process of mediation"). See
also Lee & Giesler, supra n. 81, at 289 (arguing that "courts are willing to use their strongest judicial
powers to preserve the confidentiality of the mediation process, an approach supported by the facts of
th[is] cas[e] and also by a central tenet of mediation theory: that the process inherently requires a
substantial guarantee of confidentiality to be effective").
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Mediation is based on the principle of self-determination.332 Voluntary
mediation is, at its most basic level, a function of the decisions of the parties.333 The
parties appear largely to choose to use mediation. 3 4 Their choices control the
structure of the mediation process, and their choices will determine whether an
agreement is reached. The choices of the parties should also control the type and
extent of confidentiality needed within a specific mediation. Many types of disputes
maybe mediated. Mediation may attract many levels of participants. 335 Simply put,
not all parties to mediation will want or need the same level of confidentiality.
Mediation is an alternative to traditional litigation. While some argue that
mediation is increasingly becoming more like litigation,336 mediation has not lost the
self-determination that is its base. The parties should be able to decide what
confidentiality means to them and how extensive they want that protection to be.
The most effective way to address those objectives is by drafting specific contract
provisions before commencing mediation.337 A contract provision creating and
defining confidentiality allows the parties to understand the obligations they are
undertaking and the measure of protection they can likely expect. 33 ' The provision
should explicitly recognize that protection may be reduced or dissolved under certain
circumstances.
I offer contract provisions as if no other form of protection was available
to the parties. If such protection did exist, contract provisions could be used to

332. Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, Standard I (Am. Arb. Ass'n et al.) ("A mediator shall
recognize that mediation is based on the principle of self-determination by the parties").
333. I have also discussed mediation as an increasingly lawyer driven activity. See generallyReich,
supra n. 291. The essence of that'article was that lawyers greatly influence when mediation will occur,
what interests will be addressed, and how the process will work. Even in lawyer driven mediation the
truly final choices belong to the client or party. At a minimum, the parties always make the decision of
whether or not agreement is reached.
334. My sense is that the majority of disputes are getting to mediation by voluntary choice, however
I have never seen definitive data on this point. It may be that the majority of disputes are going to
mediation as a result of court order.
335. Some parties to mediation may be sophisticated, or knowledgeable about their legal rights and
personal priorities. Others may be unsophisticated and lack such knowledge. Less sophisticated parties
may need or desire to exchange information with persons outside of the dispute or to have non-parties
actually involved in the process. See Letter from Gregory Firestone to the Honorable Michael B. Getty,
Chair, NCCUSL Uniform Mediation Act Committee on behalf of the Academy of Family Mediators,
section 1 (Oct. 18, 2000). ("We are also aware that, in fact, some participants do talk with family
members and others following mediation despite some state laws that currently provide that mediation
is confidential").
The UMA has attempted to address the desire for non-party participation in the mediation
process. See U.M.A. § 10 (May draft) ("An attorney or other individual designated by the party may
accompany the party and participate in a mediation. A waiver of participation given before the mediation
may be rescinded").
336. See e.g. Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as "Litigation Lite": Proceduraland Evidentiary Norms
Embedded Within Alternative Dispute Resolution, 47 Emory L.J. 1289 (1998).
337. See Freedman & Prigoff, supra n. 29, at 43 ("A confidentiality provision can be crafted with
appropriate exceptions and flexibility to mitigate the disutilities of a blanket privilege").
338. On a related note, this understanding is becoming increasingly important with mediation services
being conducted on-line. Absent a specific contractual provision, the parties may have little idea what
confidentiality protection exists for their communication or under what law issues arising out of that
protection will be decided.
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clarify the parties' agreement and responsibilities regarding confidentiality.339
Contract provisions could be especially useful in jurisdictions which rely on
"settlement discussion" or Rule 408340 protections.34' The Rule 408 protection could
be used as a starting point, with the parties utilizing contract provisions to identify
any further expectations of confidentiality.342

C. PotentialConcerns with
ContractProvisionsCreatingConfidentiality
There is no perfect solution to the uncertainty of mediation confidentiality
protection. Contract provisions allow the parties to specify what they want
confidentiality to be in a particular mediation, but the use of contractual provisions
also has potential weaknesses that must be addressed.
1. Contractual provisions are not
binding on persons not party to the contract
If confidentiality is a priority to a party or parties in a mediation, then their
concern for confidentiality may not be limited to the disclosure of information in
subsequent adversarial proceedings. The party or parties may also be concerned
3 43
with a general dissemination of information learned in mediation to the public.

339. As an example, section 31-04-11 of the North Dakota Century Code generally renders evidence
of any admission made in the course of mediation inadmissible as evidence in a subsequent judicial
proceeding. It also prohibits the disclosure of such information except as required by statute. The code
states that "this section does not limit compulsion or admissibility if:
1. The evidence relates to a crime, civil fraud, or violation
under the Uniform Juvenile Justice Act;
2. The evidence relates to breach of duty by the mediator;
3. The validity of the mediated agreement is at issue; or
4. All persons who conducted or otherwise participated in
the mediation consent to disclosure."
N.D. Cent. Code § 31-04-11 (1999). A contract provision could identify whether the parties had
consented to disclosure under sub-section (4). That provision could assist a court in determining later
issues of admissibility or disclosure based upon the existence of consent. See id. § 31-04-11(4).
340. See Fed. R. Evid. 408.
341. Rule 408, or its equivalent, appears to be the most uniform and common source of possible
confidentiality protection. See Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence §§ 40846, 408-59 (1995 & Supp. 1995) for a list of states adopting a similar statute.
342. See Green, supra n. 10, at 19. As an example, a contract provision could limit the disclosure of
items discussed during mediation, even when those items may not be in dispute in a subsequent
proceeding.
343. Persons using mediation for highly personal issues may be more concerned about disclosure to
the public than use of information against them at trial. Fairly common examples include parties using
dissolution of marriage mediation and parent-child mediation.
Shuman and Weiner addressed confidentiality between psychiatrists or psychologists and
patients. Like mediation, psychiatry and psychology can also involve highly personal issues. The
disclosure of information during these processes could create civil liability or criminal culpability, yet
patients primarily wanted confidentiality for its protection from disclosure to the court of general public
opinion, not a subsequent adversarial tribunal. Shuman & Weiner supra n. 50, at 83. See supra text
accompanying nn. 123, 125.
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The UMA Privilege Against Disclosure would not provide the type of confidentiality
sought by these parties because its scope is limited to information elicited at
legislative hearings or compelled revelation in subsequent adversarial proceedings. 3"
Contract provisions also cannot bind non-parties 4 but, unlike the Privilege
Against Disclosure, contract provisions can limit the risk of disclosure of mediation
communications to and by general non-parties. Contract provisions can specifically
limit the parties to the contract from disclosing information. By decreasing the
initial dissemination of information, the contracting parties also decrease the
likelihood that outside parties will be aware of information revealed during
mediation and that those parties will have the opportunity to reveal that information
to others.
It is likely that any form of confidentiality protection may be subject to
judicial interpretation at some point. Non-parties seeking to pierce a confidentiality
protection often turn to the courts for relief.3 46 Many courts have utilized forms of
balancing tests, weighing the interests of the parties and the mediation process
against the interests of the parties seeking disclosure.3 47 A clearly defined contract
provision identifies the parties' expectations of confidentiality and the interests
underlying those expectations. A clearly worded contractual provision may decrease
the risk that a reviewing court will misconstrue the parties' interests or intent when
seeking to define and balance competing interests. While there is no guarantee what
a reviewing court will decide, contractual provisions may at least provide the courts
with clear information upon which to render a decision.
2. Courts may void contractual confidentiality
provisions as violative of public policy
The second concern with the use of contractual confidentiality protection
is that a contract provision could be viewed as an attempt to suppress evidence and
may be void as a matter of public policy. 348 While some contend that
"[c]onfidentiality in mediation is fundamentally at odds with a system of law
favoring consideration of all relevant evidence,"34 9 various courts have recognized
a significant difference between a contract created to suppress otherwise admissible
or necessary evidence and one which more generally safeguards communications in
order to promote a candid exchange of information. Those courts have held that
contractual confidentiality protection will not be breached absent a sufficiently
compelling reason.

344. See U.M.A. § 3(8) (May draft).
345. See Macturk, supra n. 203, at 417.
346. See e.g. U.S. v.Ky. Utilities Co., 124 F.R.D. 146 (E.D. Ky. 1989), rev'd, 927 F.2d 252 (6th Cir.
1991).
347. See Conrad, supra n. 296, at 49.
348. Freedman & Prigoff, supra n. 29, at 41 ("In many situations, disputants agree at the outset of
mediation that nothing said will be subsequently disclosed. These agreements are persuasive as to the
parties' intent. However, courts may not uniformly uphold such agreements. Agreements to suppress
evidence are generally void as against public policy").
349. See Freedman & Prigoff, supra n. 29, at 39.
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35°
In Paranzino v. Barnett Bank of South Florida,
Paranzino sued Barnett
Bank for breach of contract. The parties attended court ordered mediation while
litigation was pending.35' The parties did not resolve the dispute at mediation, but
the parties did sign a contract binding them to keep information revealed at
mediation in confidence.352 Paranzino revealed facts and settlement offers to the
Miami Herald. Barnett Bank moved for sanctions.353 The court dismissed the
original case with prejudice, its most severe sanction."' The appellate court upheld
the sanction finding that "[i]f the trial court were to allow this willful and deliberate
conduct to go unchecked, continued behavior in this vein could have a chilling effect
'
upon the mediation process."355
In Kentucky Utilities, the Department of Justice and Kentucky Utilities
settled an anti-trust action.356 The Lexington Herald-Leader newspaper then filed a
motion to intervene, requesting copies of specific documents. 57 The settlement
agreement had required these documents to be destroyed.358 The newspaper sought
a modification of that agreement.35 9 The court issued a ruling modifying the
agreement.3' 6 The Sixth Circuit reversed the decision employing a balancing test
requiring the newspaper to prove its need for the documents outweighed the original
parties' interests in preserving the terms of the Order and the public's interest in
fostering and preserving settlements. 6
In both cases the courts specifically acknowledged the importance of
protecting the confidentiality created by contract. In Kentucky Utilities II, the court
recognized that society as a whole may benefit from the fostering of agreements
promoted by confidentiality.362 In Paranzino, the court was willing to use its
strongest sanction to punish a party breaching a contract provision creating
confidentiality in mediation.363 There may always be parties and persons unhappy
with information unavailable to them who seek to use the court system to compel
disclosure. It is the role of the courts to interpret laws, interpret contract language
and intent, and to determine the scope and weight of public policy. It appears that
the courts will continue to develop balancing tests, as in Kentucky Utilities,3 64 and
use these tests to decide challenges to confidentiality protection.363 While there is
no guarantee of confidentiality, a contractual provision can help the courts in these

350. 690 S.2d 725 (Fla. App. 1997).
351. Id. at 726.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id. at730.
355. Id.at 729.
356. Ky. Utilities, 124 F.R.D. at147.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 148.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. U.S. v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 927 F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1991) (hereinafter referred to as Kentucky
Utilities11).
362. Id.
363. Paranzino,690 S.2d 725.
364. See Macaluso, 618 F.2d 51.
365. The UMA anticipates courts using a balancing test in applying the Privilege Against Disclosure.
See supra nn. 154, 313.
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balancing tests by clearly setting forth the interests and expectations of the parties
undertaking mediation. The courts will then have a clear expression of the parties'
interests to use in their analysis.
3. Contractual agreements do not carry
the same legal authority as privileges
A privilege is a unique protection. It exists because society has decided that
the right or relationship protected by the privilege takes precedence over the
principle that the trier of fact should have everyman's best evidence. It may be
argued that contract provisions do not have the heightened legal status of, and will
not be afforded the same level of protection, as a privilege.366 As a general legal
principle that is undoubtedly true. However, in the mediation context, it is difficult
to determine how much more weight or authority a privilege would carry than
contract provisions.
At base level the extent of either protection is uncertain. Courts have
upheld contract provisions creating confidentiality in the mediation process.3 6 It
seems a reasonable assumption that courts have limited or voided contracts creating
mediation confidentiality as well. Courts have both recognized a mediation
privilege3 6 and refused to strictly apply such protection even when that protection
existed by statute.369 Will contractual mediation confidentiality provisions always
be enforced? No, but cases show that contract provisions carry legal import with
the courts and are likely to be enforced. Will a privilege always be enforced? No,
but it also appears they are likely to be enforced.
Privileges provide a unique level of protection, but that level of protection
can be misleading because parties to mediation may not be aware of privilege
limitations.370 For both privileges and contract provisions the likelihood of
compelled disclosure is largely dependent on a court's determination of the value of
the relationship seeking confidentiality. If mediators and parties are aware that
contract provisions do not create absolute confidentiality, then the use of contract
provisions is more intellectually honest than the use of privilege. 371 Parties using

366. See Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1120 ("[T]here may well be greater judicial reluctance to compel
disclosure when the word 'privilege' attaches, especially if the privilege is hoary and central to long
standing perceptions of professional self-interest").
367. See generally Lee & Giesler, supra n. 81.
368. See Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164; Sheldone, 104 F. Supp. 2d 511.
369. See Rinaker, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464; Foxgate,92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916; Foxgate, 25 P.3d 1117; Olam,
68 F. Supp 1110.
370. See Kentra, supra n. 81, at 722 ("Mediation would not be nearly as effective if the parties were
not assured their discussions would remain private"). This belief may even be perpetuated by the courts
themselves. See Lee & Giesler, supra n. 81, at 294 ("In Bernard,participants' only formal notice of their
confidentiality duties consisted of court orders that failed to address any potential exceptions, aside from
consent. The court orders simply stated: 'The entire mediation process is confidential').
371. Professor Kirtley sums up what maybe the response of many privilege proponents to my position
on contract provisions. See Kirtley, supra n. 202, at 2 ("Often written agreements to mediate are signed
specifying, among other things, that parties will not reveal mediation information, the mediator cannot
be subpoenaed and any exceptions to confidentiality. While such agreements may create expectations
of confidentiality their enforceability is problematic. Because the law views courts as entitled to 'every
man's evidence,' public policy forbids contracting to exclude evidence. Agreements between individuals

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2001/iss2/1

54

Reich: Reich: Call for Intellectual Honesty
2001]

A CallforIntellectual Honesty

well-drafted contract provisions will not be mislead into the false security of absolute
confidentiality. They know up front that compelled disclosure is a possibility. They
are not relying on a level of protection that does not exist and may cause them, and
the mediation process as a whole,"' injury. Well drafted, and understood,3 73contract
provisions allow the parties to specify what they want and expect from
confidentiality in a particular mediation. Party awareness created by contract
drafting and review may be greater than party awareness of a privilege largely
predicated on a mediator's explanation, especially when that explanation may or may
not occur and may or may not be accurate.
V. CONCLUSION
There is an old adage that counsels to "Buy cheap and sell early." Adopting
the Privilege Against Disclosure would cause us to buy cheap and sell cheap, and it
would make the purchase and sale of subsequent privileges even cheaper. With
each new privilege created under the standard of "everybody knows it's important"
both new and existing privileges become worth less. With each privilege created
under the lack of standards necessary to allow enactment of the Privilege Against
Disclosure, privilege protection moves farther from unique and closer to common.
The standard of "reason and experience" should be used by state legislatures
considering the Privilege Against Disclosure. Some may complain that the standard
is difficult to satisfy. It is supposed to be. Those seeking privileges are seeking the
exception to the rule that a court and society is entitled to every man's best evidence.
Their burden should be high. If the standard is easy to satisfy, many relationships
will be privileged and privilege will lose the uniqueness that is its primary power and
importance. The Privilege Against Disclosure fails both components of the "reason
and experience" standard. There is no compelling empirical argument that mediation
needs confidentiality and the privilege fails all four requirements of the Wigmore
analysis as well.

are not permitted to restrict the court's access to testimony in pursuit of justice. As a result, mediation
participants are ill advised to rely on contract theory as a means of preserving mediation confidentiality").
Kirtley broadly asserts that "public policy forbids contracting to exclude evidence." Id.
However, courts have upheld confidentiality created by contract provisions. See Paranzino,690 S.2d
725; Kentucky Utilities, 124 F.R.D. 146; Kentucky Utilities 11,
927 F.2d 252. See also text accompanying
nn. 349-352. Kirtley then argues that "mediation participants are ill advised to rely on contract theory."
Kirtley, supra n. 202, at 11. I submit that mediation participants are more ill advised to rely on the
mediator's blanket promise that "whatever is said in this room stays in this room" and are better served
by relying on contract provisions that, even under Kirtley's own analysis, specifically identify "any
exceptions to confidentiality." Id. at 10.
372. See Lee & Giesler, supra n. 81, at 296 ("The danger... is that participants will conclude that the
initial assurances of confidentiality had no substantive meaning, and may question the integrity of the
entire [mediation] process").
373. 1 recognize that there may be parties to mediation who may not understand clearly worded
contract provisions. My sense is that the parties are more likely to understand contract provisions than
be made aware of the extent of confidentiality protection by a mediator or through independent
knowledge.
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I am well aware of Mark Twain's general skepticism of numbers.374 I
recognize that the data I have presented is susceptible to different interpretations.373
Even if it could be viewed as creating a compelling empirical and societal
justification for the Privilege Against Disclosure, privilege is not an appropriate
mechanism for creating mediation confidentiality. Privileges have never been
applied to relationships of competing or adversarial needs. Ignoring the precedent
of privilege will create protections that are worth less and that is not fair to the
relationships that truly warrant privilege protection.
There is no mechanism that guarantees complete confidentiality. There is
no empirical proof that mediation needs confidentiality, but a party or parties to a
mediation may want it. If parties want a measure of confidentiality, they can attempt
to create it through contract provisions. Contract provisions reflect mediation's
principle of self-determination, and specify the parties' expectations and
responsibilities for information revealed during the mediation process. Contract
provisions can be used to create confidentiality protection when there is none.
Contract provisions can increase or clarify protection desired by the parties in light
of existing confidentiality protections.
I have called for intellectual honesty because so much of the justification
for confidentiality in mediation, and the resulting Privilege Against Disclosure, is
speculation or belief and the arguments are merely opinions. Granted they are
dogmatic opinions, but they are opinions nonetheless. A privilege takes away
probative evidence from a trier of fact. It renders a court unable to make a full
determination based on all relevant facts because certain facts are specifically
excluded by the privilege. Without question there are circumstances or relationships
that justify such exclusion, but we must question the basis of these circumstances or
relationship through intellectual honesty and empirical examination. If we do not
do so, we sell that which should be precious, cheap. In effect we become inverse
alchemists, turning scarce gold into common lead.

374. "There are three kinds of lies: lies, damn lies, and statistics." Dictionary of Quotations 318
(Robin Hyman ed., Natl. Textbook Co. 1985) (quoting Mark Twain,Autobiography (P.F. Collier & Son
Co. 1924)).
375. 1readily admit that the data I have presented can be interpreted in many different ways. However
I submit that the data can reasonably be interpreted in two ways, while satisfaction of the "reason and
experience" standard would require it to be interpreted in a third.
I submit that the data does not demonstrate that mediation needs confidentiality or that a legal
privilege creates the disclosure of information in analogous relationships. Others could interpret the data
as inconclusive, and take the position that they cannot determine if there is a correlation between
confidentiality and disclosure. I do not believe that the data can reasonably be interpreted to provide a
compelling justification for the contention that mediation needs confidentiality or that confidentiality in
mediation promotes greater disclosure.
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